Talk:Free will: Difference between revisions

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imported>John R. Brews
(Peter Jackson)
imported>John R. Brews
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:Nick: I'm sure there is a place for a discussion of these experiments in summary form. A proper treatment probably requires an article unto itself. I was unaware of the "veto" demonstration, and Harris' book doesn't mention that in his very protracted discussion of these kind of observations. The paper abstract you linked appears to be less than definitive on the subject, claiming only a heuristic approach for further development.  Do you have some details? [[User:John R. Brews|John R. Brews]] 14:46, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
:Nick: I'm sure there is a place for a discussion of these experiments in summary form. A proper treatment probably requires an article unto itself. I was unaware of the "veto" demonstration, and Harris' book doesn't mention that in his very protracted discussion of these kind of observations. The paper abstract you linked appears to be less than definitive on the subject, claiming only a heuristic approach for further development.  Do you have some details? [[User:John R. Brews|John R. Brews]] 14:46, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
::All I know about that is what I read in [http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-free-will-collides-with-unconscious-impulses Michael Shermer's piece in Scientific American]. [[User:Nick Gardner|Nick Gardner]] 15:57, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
::All I know about that is what I read in [http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=how-free-will-collides-with-unconscious-impulses Michael Shermer's piece in Scientific American]. [[User:Nick Gardner|Nick Gardner]] 15:57, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
:::This discussion looks conjectural to me, as the only evidence here is that the brain activity associated with decisions is more complex than observed before. I added this source to "External Links". 
:::It looks (to me) like the real question for free will is how the decision process for dealing with specific outside inputs can be influenced by reflection. If reflection modifies the programming the brain uses for making a decision, then are we responsible for undertaking reflection and making sure our programming is in order (in our judgement)? Looks like an infinite regress is looming? [[User:John R. Brews|John R. Brews]] 17:13, 27 July 2012 (UTC)

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 Definition The intuition, or philosophical doctrine, that one can control one's actions or freely choose among alternatives. [d] [e]
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This needs to begin with a definition; and more generally, see CZ:Article Mechanics. --Larry Sanger 21:30, 17 October 2007 (CDT)

Hope this is looking better. I have also developed it further, but imagine adding behaviourism, existentialism, etc. All suggestions will be welcomed. --John B. Mackenzie 11:05, 1 November 2007 (CDT)

The definition of Gordon H. Clark has been identified. The article appeared before my revisions to be in the camp of determinism, and I revised it to a neutral position. Some categorical statements have been removed or replaced by more moderate claims. Sources have been added: there were none before. John R. Brews 16:18, 26 July 2012 (UTC)

Niels Bohr said free will and determinism are complememtary. I don't know whether this is a sufficiently significant point of view to be mentioned here. Peter Jackson 08:36, 27 July 2012 (UTC)

I'd hate to short-shrift a thinker like Bohr. I'd take it that his view is an outgrowth of the role of the observer in quantum theory: the process of observation affects what is observed. Are you able to formulate his position? John R. Brews 16:57, 27 July 2012 (UTC)

Libet's experiment

Benjamin Libet's 1983 experiment detected relevant brain activity before the subject decided to act. But similar experiments in 2007 by Marcel Brass and Patrick Haggard demonstrated that subjects could exercise a last-minute veto. Are these experiments not worth a mention? Nick Gardner 13:23, 27 July 2012 (UTC)

Nick: I'm sure there is a place for a discussion of these experiments in summary form. A proper treatment probably requires an article unto itself. I was unaware of the "veto" demonstration, and Harris' book doesn't mention that in his very protracted discussion of these kind of observations. The paper abstract you linked appears to be less than definitive on the subject, claiming only a heuristic approach for further development. Do you have some details? John R. Brews 14:46, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
All I know about that is what I read in Michael Shermer's piece in Scientific American. Nick Gardner 15:57, 27 July 2012 (UTC)
This discussion looks conjectural to me, as the only evidence here is that the brain activity associated with decisions is more complex than observed before. I added this source to "External Links".
It looks (to me) like the real question for free will is how the decision process for dealing with specific outside inputs can be influenced by reflection. If reflection modifies the programming the brain uses for making a decision, then are we responsible for undertaking reflection and making sure our programming is in order (in our judgement)? Looks like an infinite regress is looming? John R. Brews 17:13, 27 July 2012 (UTC)