U.S. foreign policy: Difference between revisions

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imported>Howard C. Berkowitz
imported>Howard C. Berkowitz
(Working on setting out policy -- this certainly needs to go to subarticles)
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====Neoconservatism====
====Neoconservatism====
====Multilateralism====
====Multilateralism====
A multilateralist foreign policy was a strong plank in the campaign platform of [[Barack Obama]]. Critics such as [[Andrew Bacevich]] call on America to have a foreign policy "rooted in humility and realism."<ref name=tws21dec116sfpoiui>{{cite news
A multilateralist foreign policy was a strong plank in the campaign platform of [[Barack Obama]]. Many have argued the very early award of the [[Nobel Peace Prize]] was less for any specific action than being "not-Bush", especially in the view of Europeans.
|author = Amy Chua
 
|title = Where Is U.S. Foreign Policy Headed?
Several conservatives, associated and not associated with neoconservatism, rejected it. [[Francis Fukuyama]] broke away from neoconservatism with his book ''[[America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy]]'',<ref name=AAC>{{citation
|quote = Perhaps the most persuasive work in this vein is Andrew Bacevich’s searing manifesto, “The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism.” Excoriating American profligacy and delusions of military invincibility, Bacevich calls for a foreign policy rooted in humility and realism.
| title = America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy
|publisher = ''The New York Times: Sunday Book Review''
| author = [[Francis Fukuyama]]
|date = October 22, 2009
| publisher = Yale University Press | year = 2006
|url = http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/25/books/review/Chua-t.html
| isbn = 0300113994}}</ref>
|accessdate = 2009-12-21
 
}}</ref>  
[[Andrew Bacevich]], discussing Fukuyama 's  thoughts on [[America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy#neoconservatism and successor doctrines|"neoconservatism and successor doctrines"]] found trends, at least before Obama, based in [[Wilsonianism|Wilsonian]] ambition and Wilsonian certainty, but with a "pronounced affinity for the sword." He regards [[Ronald Reagan]] as Wilson's truest disciple, as one who meant to put America on the right side of history, and that [[Bill Clinton]] there was a continuation of the idea that there was no alternative to democracy. Even George W. Bush was a product of a Wilsonian revival. The difference was that mainstream politicians treat American military supremacy as an unmitigated good and an evidence of [[American exceptionalism]].<ref name=Bac2005>{{citation
| author = Andrew Bacevich
| title = The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War
| publisher = Oxford University Press | year = 2005
| isbn = 0195173384}}, pp. 9-17</ref> Where there were six major military actions abroad between 1945 and 1986, they became almost annual after the fall of the Berlin Wall.


[[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] counseled a policy of self-restraint and not pressing every advantage, and listening to other nations.<blockquote>Technology has made global "have-nots" painfully conscious of their relative deprivation. It has also given them the tools to punish those they see as blocking their aspirations. If the United States is to avoid becoming the target of their resentment, its foreign policy must be seen as serving their interests as well as its own. That means exercising self-restraint rather than pressing every advantage that comes to a superpower; it means listening to others and not just working to preserve our own peace and prosperity but helping others to build their own.<ref name=WaPo2007-03-25>{{cite news
[[Zbigniew Brzezinski]] counseled a policy of self-restraint and not pressing every advantage, and listening to other nations.<blockquote>Technology has made global "have-nots" painfully conscious of their relative deprivation. It has also given them the tools to punish those they see as blocking their aspirations. If the United States is to avoid becoming the target of their resentment, its foreign policy must be seen as serving their interests as well as its own. That means exercising self-restraint rather than pressing every advantage that comes to a superpower; it means listening to others and not just working to preserve our own peace and prosperity but helping others to build their own.<ref name=WaPo2007-03-25>{{cite news

Revision as of 09:32, 8 March 2010

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See also: History of U.S. foreign policy

Ultimate responsibility for United States foreign policy rests with the President of the United States. For the ratification of formal treaties, he or she must obtain the advice and consent of the Senate.

In the modern practice of foreign policy, formally, the senior foreign policy official below the President is the U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton. In practice, the critical decisionmakers are the members of the National Security Council, which includes the Secretary of State. Other major influencers are in the National Security Council staff, headed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, James Jones. The U.S. Department of Defense, under Secretary Robert Gates, obviously has a major effect, as does the United States intelligence community, coordinated by Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair.

Foreign policy formulation and execution is structured on regional and functional areas. Over recent years, there has been an attempt to reconcile the regional definitions of the various departments and agencies, so a country is not under one bureau of the State Department but under a different Unified Combatant Command in the military. This is not completely successful; the countries of the Mediterranean littoral as well as the Levant are under one Assistant Secretary of State, but the United States European Command is responsible for the former but the United States Central Command for the latter.

Foreign policy also needs to be considered in relation to the U.S. and world situation of the time.

Regional

Africa

U.S African policy is principally focused on the Subsaharan part of the continent. For reasons of colonial sensitivity, the United States Africa Command is considered a unified subcommand of United States European Command.

Europe and Eurasia

East Asia and Pacific

North Korea is the hot spot, and the U.S. regional priority is to insist on the Six-Party Talks, which also recognize China as a key broker.

Near East

For more information, see: U.S. policy towards the Middle East.

More than in most areas in the world, policies twist and turn and involve multiple countries. Nevertheless, there are some basic principles both for the region and for countries.

Egypt

While the U.S. continues to provide major economic support to Egypt, there is increasing concern about succession, with President Hosni Mubarrak reported to be in poor health.

Iran

For more information, see: U.S. policy towards Iran.

The Obama administration avoids the military threats implied by the previous administration, by the U.S. or others. While it is giving moral encouragement to the domestic protesters following the 2009 election, it is taking time, establishing a moral position, and waiting on events. It does appear to be holding back on direct engagement at any high level.

It is quite serious about pressuring Iran to stop what is seen as a nuclear weapons program, b as the best means to accomplish this goal. Instead, a consensus is growing, with allies, to use economic warfare, targeted at Iran's lack of internal petroleum refining capacity, and thus, while ironically an oil producer, a gasoline importer. [1]

Iraq

For more information, see: U.S. policy towards Iraq.
See also: Iraq War

Israel

Lebanon

Syria

South and Central Asia

Afghanistan and Pakistan

For more information, see: U.S. policy towards Afghanistan.
For more information, see: U.S. policy towards Pakistan.

In many respects, it sees this as one problem; the political geography of the area also supports the argument that the Durand Line border between the two may have been convenient for the British, but does not reflect the boundaries of the Pashtun people.

Western Hemisphere Affairs

Functional

A number of these areas will definitely involve more agencies than the Department of State.

  • International Organization Affairs (IO)

Security

Economic

Democracy promotion and information

Cultural

  • Educational and Cultural Affairs (ECA)

Law enforcement, including drug trade

Human Rights

  • Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)
  • Global Women's Issues (S/GWI)

Science

Doctrines

Time periods

A new nation

19th Century

First World War and interwar

Second World War

Cold War

Initial containment

For more information, see: Containment policy.

Based on concepts from diplomat George Kennan, the U.S. began, in the Truman Administration, a "containment policy", which affected U.S. policy throughout the Cold War. Kennan's basic hypothesis was that the Soviet ideology convinced them that their cause was historically preordained to win, so, while they might seem bellicose, they were actually risk-averse and would eventually pull back in confrontations. As a result, it was U.S. policy to strengthen the rest of the world against Communism, with military bases on the borders and in threatened areas, and economic, psychological and political support to nations threatened by Communism.

The Marshall Plan was the largest economic effort. Arguably, the Berlin Blockade was the first, limited military confrontation, where American logistical and industrial power could prevail.

Interventionism

Strategic deterrence
Proxy wars

Detente

Middle East

Change to a multilateral world

Political Islam and other revolutionary forces

9-11 Attacks

Neoconservatism

Multilateralism

A multilateralist foreign policy was a strong plank in the campaign platform of Barack Obama. Many have argued the very early award of the Nobel Peace Prize was less for any specific action than being "not-Bush", especially in the view of Europeans.

Several conservatives, associated and not associated with neoconservatism, rejected it. Francis Fukuyama broke away from neoconservatism with his book America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy,[2]

Andrew Bacevich, discussing Fukuyama 's thoughts on "neoconservatism and successor doctrines" found trends, at least before Obama, based in Wilsonian ambition and Wilsonian certainty, but with a "pronounced affinity for the sword." He regards Ronald Reagan as Wilson's truest disciple, as one who meant to put America on the right side of history, and that Bill Clinton there was a continuation of the idea that there was no alternative to democracy. Even George W. Bush was a product of a Wilsonian revival. The difference was that mainstream politicians treat American military supremacy as an unmitigated good and an evidence of American exceptionalism.[3] Where there were six major military actions abroad between 1945 and 1986, they became almost annual after the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Zbigniew Brzezinski counseled a policy of self-restraint and not pressing every advantage, and listening to other nations.

Technology has made global "have-nots" painfully conscious of their relative deprivation. It has also given them the tools to punish those they see as blocking their aspirations. If the United States is to avoid becoming the target of their resentment, its foreign policy must be seen as serving their interests as well as its own. That means exercising self-restraint rather than pressing every advantage that comes to a superpower; it means listening to others and not just working to preserve our own peace and prosperity but helping others to build their own.[4]

Others have described technology as both a strength and liability. In The Pentagon's New Map, Thomas P.M. Barnett saw "connecting to the core" as essential in reducing conflict in poor nations.

There had been considerable sympathy, after 9/11, for the Afghanistan War (2001-), but the Iraq War was largely seen as U.S. unilateralism.

References

  1. "Obama considers Iran gas cut-off", United Press International, 3 August 2009
  2. Francis Fukuyama (2006), America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy, Yale University Press, ISBN 0300113994
  3. Andrew Bacevich (2005), The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War, Oxford University Press, ISBN 0195173384, pp. 9-17
  4. James M. Lindsay (book reviewer). The Superpower Blues: Zbigniew Brzezinski says we have one last shot at getting the post-9/11 world right. book review of "Second Chance" by Zbigniew Brzezinski, 'The Washington Post', March 25, 2007. Retrieved on 2009-12-21.