Talk:Afghanistan War (2001-2021): Difference between revisions
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I don't remember any report to that effect at the time. Not until long after did we get a video of bin Laden claiming responsibility. On the contrary, the reason the Taliban were reported as giving for refusing to hand him over was that they'd been presented with no proof. [[User:Peter Jackson|Peter Jackson]] 09:48, 14 August 2010 (UTC) | I don't remember any report to that effect at the time. Not until long after did we get a video of bin Laden claiming responsibility. On the contrary, the reason the Taliban were reported as giving for refusing to hand him over was that they'd been presented with no proof. [[User:Peter Jackson|Peter Jackson]] 09:48, 14 August 2010 (UTC) | ||
:I can't give you references from memory, although check the [[al-Qaeda]] article. They do exist. To some extent, the Taliban argument was based on [[pashtunwali]]. Alternatively, the Taliban did not effectively participate in diplomatic processes, were recognized by only three nations (one revoked after 9/11). There was much more evidence than videos, and, to start with, the 1998 declaration of war by A-Q. | :I can't give you references from memory, although check the [[al-Qaeda]] article. They do exist. To some extent, the Taliban argument was based on [[pashtunwali]]. Alternatively, the Taliban did not effectively participate in diplomatic processes, were recognized by only three nations (one revoked after 9/11). There was much more evidence than videos, and, to start with, the 1998 declaration of war by A-Q. The dance with the Taliban was a kabuki performance for public relations. | ||
:In any event, the 9/11 attack planning was done principally in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, admittedly in small cells. The leadership and training moved to Afghanistan for security, just as the Services Office had begun in Pakistan. | :In any event, the 9/11 attack planning was done principally in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, admittedly in small cells. The leadership and training moved to Afghanistan for security, just as the Services Office had begun in Pakistan. | ||
:Let me add that the matter was not primarily being decided based on public announcements. There was hard intelligence data that some A-Q components were in Afghanistan. While the U.S. might have preferred a diplomatic solution, there was no question that military action was actively being prepared; it might have been avoided had the Taliban handed over A-Q but no one really expected that. Due to U.S. errors at the [[Battle of Tora Bora]], most of the top A-Q leadership escaped to Pakistan toward the end of the main combat phase. [[User:Howard C. Berkowitz|Howard C. Berkowitz]] 13:13, 14 August 2010 (UTC) |
Revision as of 08:01, 14 August 2010
Thoughts on structure
I'd like to find a way to structure this so that the Phase I-III combat operations can be made an approvable article, while continuing to deal with the continuing security situation. Thoughts? Howard C. Berkowitz 22:00, 15 May 2009 (UTC)
Is this right?
"the al-Qaeda senior leadership, who took responsibility for the attacks"
I don't remember any report to that effect at the time. Not until long after did we get a video of bin Laden claiming responsibility. On the contrary, the reason the Taliban were reported as giving for refusing to hand him over was that they'd been presented with no proof. Peter Jackson 09:48, 14 August 2010 (UTC)
- I can't give you references from memory, although check the al-Qaeda article. They do exist. To some extent, the Taliban argument was based on pashtunwali. Alternatively, the Taliban did not effectively participate in diplomatic processes, were recognized by only three nations (one revoked after 9/11). There was much more evidence than videos, and, to start with, the 1998 declaration of war by A-Q. The dance with the Taliban was a kabuki performance for public relations.
- In any event, the 9/11 attack planning was done principally in Pakistan, not Afghanistan, admittedly in small cells. The leadership and training moved to Afghanistan for security, just as the Services Office had begun in Pakistan.
- Let me add that the matter was not primarily being decided based on public announcements. There was hard intelligence data that some A-Q components were in Afghanistan. While the U.S. might have preferred a diplomatic solution, there was no question that military action was actively being prepared; it might have been avoided had the Taliban handed over A-Q but no one really expected that. Due to U.S. errors at the Battle of Tora Bora, most of the top A-Q leadership escaped to Pakistan toward the end of the main combat phase. Howard C. Berkowitz 13:13, 14 August 2010 (UTC)
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