Talk:Reality: Difference between revisions
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:::In a sense, then, in conversing using our concepts of reality we converse using ''inventions'' of human minds, constructed of symbols. In effect, we invent reality, or realities. | :::In a sense, then, in conversing using our concepts of reality we converse using ''inventions'' of human minds, constructed of symbols. In effect, we invent reality, or realities. | ||
:::If human symbolic processing can invent realities, perhaps some kind of symbolic processing invents reality itself. [[User:Anthony.Sebastian|Anthony.Sebastian]] 17:31, 25 July 2011 (UTC) | :::If human symbolic processing can invent realities, perhaps some kind of symbolic processing invents reality itself. | ||
[[User:Anthony.Sebastian|Anthony.Sebastian]] 17:31, 25 July 2011 (UTC) | |||
:::: Mathematical objects are abstract. Nevertheless many mathemticians consider themselves as Platonists, and say that they ''discover'' mathematical objects and structures -- in contrast to inventing or creating them. However, they cannot ''prove'' this ... --[[User:Peter Schmitt|Peter Schmitt]] 17:49, 25 July 2011 (UTC) |
Revision as of 12:49, 25 July 2011
Early comments
Page created--Maria Cuervo 22:21, 2 April 2011 (UTC)
Good start. Two things I think it needs are Johnson's "I refute it thus" [1] and the 60s T-shirt "Reality is for people who cannot handle drugs". Sandy Harris 00:54, 3 April 2011 (UTC)
- Or "... science fiction" in another version. Peter Jackson 10:51, 4 April 2011 (UTC)
- Thank you Sandy. I'll slowly work my way to Johnson but if you want to create an applicable section, go for it. Thank you for the suggestions. Is there an image for the T-shirt? I imagine that would be a great relief from the seriousness of Plato, to wear it or even to just see the image.--Maria Cuervo 01:08, 3 April 2011 (UTC)
- Hayford: I didn't even see that apostrophe in the definition of Reality!
- Also Schroedinger's cat and at least two butterflies — Chuang Tzu's and the one in Chaos theory. Sandy Harris 04:23, 3 April 2011 (UTC)
- Nice. BTW, I worked for a decade in IT before switching to Philosophy, so I did enjoy reading your profile. I'm a bit of a polyglot and taught myself a few languages. Doing Oracle, perl, php, cold fusion, asp, pl/sql, regX, whatever and anything. Whatever was needed. I've written my own little content management system which by now is pretty old and useless. (So I retired my personal sites that used the program, for now.) I did consider having myself added to the technology workgroup? but wondered if it was too much. At least I could on occasion write articles on Baudrillard or other philosophy-related technology issues that could cross link. Who knows.--Maria Cuervo 04:43, 3 April 2011 (UTC)
Also, Holographic Universe
I'm interested in this (Is it Talbot that wrote on it?) and see certain affinities between it and Plato's cosmology.
Definition for Reality
What I tried to attempt in the definition was one which could be concise and clear yet accommodate vastly different meanings. The definition used works in Platonic Realism but depending on how the terms within it are defined, e.g., being, also with phenomenology.--Maria Cuervo 13:52, 4 April 2011 (UTC)
- Saw a quote today, attributed to Einstein "Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one." I do not know if that is genuine, but if it is, it belongs in the article. Sandy Harris 14:11, 4 April 2011 (UTC)
- I think that a whole page could go Einstein's string theory version of reality v. the holographic version and link back here. This page could become a huge project.
Physicists about philosophy?
Maybe somebody (Anthony?) could explain to me why a couple of physicists have especially noteworthy views on this topic? Basically, they're trying to do philosophy. There are far more important thinkers who talk about the concept of reality.
I'm not trying to start a fight, or disrespect Stephen Hawkings or Anthony of course (I love both!), I'm just rather tired of non-philosophers (Dawkins is another example) being thought of as making important contributions to philosophy, when they're basically just authors who are using their popularity as a platform from which to advance theories, probably without reference to serious philosophers, who do this sort of thing for a living... --Larry Sanger 03:41, 18 July 2011 (UTC)
- I know of a couple of physicists who don't know that such a field as philosophy exists, and write about philosophy under the impression that they're writing about physics. Michael Hardy 04:21, 18 July 2011 (UTC)
- Hi, Larry. Sorry to hear you're "rather tired of non-philosophers...being thought of as making important contributions to philosophy...". I guess you can view Hawking and Mlodinow as being thought of as contributing to philosophy. Actually, when it comes to science, you can't do philosophy very well if you don't understand the science, they argue. Nobody understands quantum reality, but some scientists spend their lives learning as much as they can about it. Many are philosophers at heart, and contribute insights to questions that can't be answered by science alone. The first philosophers were philosophers of nature, but not scientists. The latest philosophers are both. I could not label Stephen Hawking a non-philosopher. Perhaps 'metascientist'? Anthony.Sebastian 04:27, 18 July 2011 (UTC)
- Um, this article is called reality, not philosophy? I hope Larry isn't trying to suggest that the only people who can have views on reality are people with philosophy degrees. That in itself seems to be a somewhat anti-scientific view. David Finn 06:03, 18 July 2011 (UTC)
- Reality is a philosophical concept. CZ is an expert-based site, or academic-based, maybe, but not specifically science-based. Look at the workgroup list.
- On the particular topic in question, I don't think Hawking & co are saying anything particularly new. You'll probably find it all already in philosophers of science. Yes, of course you can have different theories giving the same empirical predictions. Usually scientists choose between them on the basis of usefulness, e.g. simplicity. For example, there are versions of creationism and intelligent design that are empirically indistinguishable from standard evolutionary theory. They're just not very useful, and probably more complicated (if God makes things happen as if they evolved through natural selection, then the entire theory of natural selection would have to be implicitly present in his mind, so these theories contain the other in toto, with additions). Peter Jackson 15:04, 20 July 2011 (UTC)
- I see the article is listed in philosophy and classics workgroups. I don't think the EC has yet worked out a policy on workgroups. Peter Jackson 15:08, 20 July 2011 (UTC)
- What might be more interesting to cover is the philosophical implications for the concept of reality of quantum mechanics. What you've got there is a complicated mathematical formalism that doesn't seem to "describe" anything one might want to call "reality". You might say it does nothing but predict the results of experiments (correctly), without explaining why the experiments have those results in any way we can understand.
- For example, it says "If you do this experiment, you can measure position. If you do that, you can measure momentum. But you can't do both experiments. If you do this experiment you'll observe a particle. [That is, you'll get the sorts of results you'd expect to get if there were "really" a particle there.] If you do that you'll observe a wave." So what is "real" here? Is there a particle, or a wave, or both, or neither? Has it got a position, or a momentum, or both, or neither? There are "hidden-variable theories" that describe some sort of reality and give the same experimental predictions, but physicists don't seem to find them useful. Peter Jackson 15:18, 20 July 2011 (UTC)
- There are articles about the physicist Niels Bohr in multi-volume encyclopaedias of philosophy. I haven't tried looking up Hawking. Peter Jackson 15:19, 20 July 2011 (UTC)
- I will try to come up with a list of scientists widely regarded a philosophers of science. Anthony.Sebastian 20:13, 20 July 2011 (UTC)
- Have to admit I get occasionally irritated by philosophers who try to be neuroscientists. On balance, has philosophy benefited more from scientists than science has from philosophers? Gareth Leng 15:46, 21 July 2011 (UTC)
- Good question, Gareth. Obviously, for non-scientist philosophers to write about the philosophy of science—most particularly when they try to formulate and answer questions about science that cannot be answered by scientific methods themselves—it would seem they should have a good understanding of the science. Hawking and Mlodinow make no bones about that:
How can we understand the world in which we find ourselves? How does the universe behave? What is the nature of reality? Where did all this come from? Did the universe need a creator? Most of us do not spend most of our time worrying about these questions, but almost all of us worry about them some of the time. 'Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge. —Hawking, Stephen (2010). The Grand Design (Kindle Locations 41-45). Bantam. Kindle Edition.
- Many non-scientist philosophers do an estimable job, in my opinion, and have significantly advanced the philosophy of science. One might ask whether such creatures as non-scientist philosophers exist, as all philosophers are seekers of knowledge, trying to pick up where scientists leave off. Perhaps we should consider philosophers of science, theoretical scientists.
- I would like to see traditional philosophers, including philosophers of science, recognize the philosophical contributions of scientists to the philosophy of science. To seek knowledge, we need trained philosophers thinking about science and trained scientists thinking philosophically. —Anthony.Sebastian 17:41, 21 July 2011 (UTC)
Mathematics and Reality
[Mathematics and Reality http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/product/9780199280797.do Mathematics and Reality] reviewed here and discussed in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy here is a recently published (2010) book that might be of interest for this article. The author is Mary Leng - my niece, so I declare an interest and won't insert any details myself. (She, unlike me, is a 'proper' philosopher, Larry.)Gareth Leng 15:35, 21 July 2011 (UTC)
- Wow, sign her up! Must be genetic ;) D. Matt Innis 00:19, 22 July 2011 (UTC)
- The notion of "reality" encompasses many topics. Bertrand Russell, who could be classified as both a philosopher and a mathematician, raised the interesting point of the assumptions underlying the practice of science, for example, the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow, which is not made more secure by noting that it has done so for some time. Likewise, the observation that it is a particular case of a general law provides no certainty that the law will continue to hold. See The Problems of Philosophy. It is somewhat like the caution in investment brochures: Past performance is not a guarantor of future performance.
- This notion shows up again in the work of Dirac and others on the possible change over time of things like the speed of light or the fine structure constant, or the second law of thermodynamics. That slow evolution of "reality" replaces Russell's very short term skepticism with one on a longer time scale, maybe related to the expansion of the universe, if one can consider cosmology to be part of "reality" (maybe it is too removed from everyday experience to be "reality"?). John R. Brews 14:16, 25 July 2011 (UTC)
- The book mentioned by Gareth (according to the summary on Amazon) discusses the viewpoint (shared by most, I think) that the success of a mathematical theory as used in a scientific theory to describe observations, is not an indicator that the underlying mathematical concepts are "real". I don't know what the concept of "reality" is in this work, having not read it. However, the topic is worth raising in the article.
- It has long been a query among scientists from Galileo to Feynman as to why mathematics should be successful in science. Weyl and others thought pure intellect could discern reality, and that led to mathematics. A different explanation is that the human mind is very limited in its capacity to process information: for example, the brain cannot store unlimited examples like a computer and rifle through them to find the closest analogy to a present situation. Accordingly, a shorthand method is used, somewhat like Aesop's fables serve to summarize some of the dilemmas of life. That shorthand happens to be mathematical in nature, more a reflection of how the brain can summarize disparate details than an indicator of what is "out there".
- The question for this article is whether reality is "out there", or is the shorthand version stored in our brain. Is the Mona Lisa reality or a window on reality? John R. Brews 14:49, 25 July 2011 (UTC)
- Along these lines, Feynman notes in his lectures that the human eye is not sensitive to the full range of the electromagnetic spectrum, from the infrared to the X-ray. Likewise, our hearing is limited compared to other species. What is the implication for reality? Do we limit "reality" to what is immediately apparent to us, or do we allow reality to include the very delicate separation of so-called "noise" in an electronic image of a star from its "spectrum" that reveals its inner workings? At some point science appears to be working on a very thin edge, where "reality" and "theory" are so intermixed that it becomes a function of who exactly is deciding what constitutes the "data", and even of who a committee allows access to the telescope to accumulate more "data", or who a committee funds to equip a laboratory. As in the days of Galileo himself, the concept of "reality" may be subject to the rules of public enterprise, not just science. John R. Brews 15:27, 25 July 2011 (UTC)
- Regarding John's last sentence, note his reference to the concept of reality. It seems reasonable to suppose a distinction between reality and a concept of reality. A concept of reality counts as a model of reality, a model constructed using language, a system of symbols such as 'natural language' or 'mathematics'. Either of those two languages, or both together, enables us to conceptualize reality, i.e., create a model of reality. Just as a map does not count as the territory, a model only represents that which it models—it maps reality but cannot duplicate it or re-create it.
- In a sense, then, in conversing using our concepts of reality we converse using inventions of human minds, constructed of symbols. In effect, we invent reality, or realities.
- If human symbolic processing can invent realities, perhaps some kind of symbolic processing invents reality itself.
Anthony.Sebastian 17:31, 25 July 2011 (UTC)
- Mathematical objects are abstract. Nevertheless many mathemticians consider themselves as Platonists, and say that they discover mathematical objects and structures -- in contrast to inventing or creating them. However, they cannot prove this ... --Peter Schmitt 17:49, 25 July 2011 (UTC)
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