Hard problem of consciousness: Difference between revisions
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Some, perhaps most, scientists believe this problem ultimately will be explained by the developing methods of neuroscience:<ref name=Kandel/> | Some, perhaps most, scientists believe this problem ultimately will be explained by the developing methods of neuroscience:<ref name=Kandel/> | ||
{{quote|What we do not understand is the hard problem of consciousness — the mystery of how neural activity gives rise to subjective experience. [http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1962/crick-bio.html Crick] and [Christof] Koch have argued that once we solve the easy problem of consciousness, the unit of consciousness, we will be able to manipulate those neural systems experimentally to solve the hard problem.|Eric R Kandel|In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind}} | {{quote|What we do not understand is the hard problem of consciousness — the mystery of how neural activity gives rise to subjective experience. [http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1962/crick-bio.html Crick] and [Christof] Koch have argued that once we solve the easy problem of consciousness, the unit of consciousness, we will be able to manipulate those neural systems experimentally to solve the hard problem.|Eric R Kandel|In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind}} | ||
A kind of inverse to the hard problem, which is the relation of physical causes to the subjective, is the problem of [[mental causation]], the query as to how, or even if, ''mental'' events, like decisions, can cause physical events.<ref name=Harbecke/> | |||
==References== | ==References== | ||
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{{cite book |title=Sensation and Perception |author=E. Bruce Goldstein |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=2tW91BWeNq4C&pg=PA39 |pages=p. 39 |chapter=Something to consider: the mind-body problem |isbn=0495601497 |year=2010 |publisher=Cengage Learning |edition=8th ed}} | {{cite book |title=Sensation and Perception |author=E. Bruce Goldstein |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=2tW91BWeNq4C&pg=PA39 |pages=p. 39 |chapter=Something to consider: the mind-body problem |isbn=0495601497 |year=2010 |publisher=Cengage Learning |edition=8th ed}} | ||
</ref> | </ref> | ||
<ref name=Harbecke> | |||
{{cite book |title=Mental Causation: Investigating the Mind's Powers in a Natural World |editor=Jens Harbecke |url=http://books.google.com/books?id=5pQxzzc6NP0C&printsec=frontcover |isbn=3938793945 |year=2008 |publisher=Ontos Verlag}} | |||
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<ref name=Kalat> | <ref name=Kalat> | ||
Revision as of 23:43, 8 December 2012
The hard problem of consciousness is finding an explanation for how physical phenomena acquire subjective characteristics becoming, for example, colors and tastes.[1] For example, "it is possible to know all the physical and functional facts concerning the operation of human brains without, for example, knowing what it is like subjectively to experience vertigo."[2] As stated by Goldstein:[3]
| ‘ | Solving the "easy" problem of consciousness involves looking tor connections between physiological responses and experiences such as perceiving "red"... This is also called the search for the neural correlate of consciousness. Solving the "hard" problem of consciousness involves determining how physiological processes such as ions flowing across the nerve membrane cause us to have experiences. | ’ |
—E. Bruce Goldstein, Sensation and Perception | ||
The term hard problem of consciousness usually is attributed to David J. Chalmers.[4]
Some, perhaps most, scientists believe this problem ultimately will be explained by the developing methods of neuroscience:[5]
| ‘ | What we do not understand is the hard problem of consciousness — the mystery of how neural activity gives rise to subjective experience. Crick and [Christof] Koch have argued that once we solve the easy problem of consciousness, the unit of consciousness, we will be able to manipulate those neural systems experimentally to solve the hard problem. | ’ |
—Eric R Kandel, In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind | ||
A kind of inverse to the hard problem, which is the relation of physical causes to the subjective, is the problem of mental causation, the query as to how, or even if, mental events, like decisions, can cause physical events.[6]
References
- ↑ For a brief historical rundown, see James W. Kalat (2008). Biological Psychology, 10th ed. Cengage Learning, p. 7. ISBN 0495603007.
- ↑ Barry Loewer. Edward Craig, general editor: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Volume 6. Oxford University Press, p. 310. ISBN 0415073103. referring to Nagel (What is it like to be a bat?, 1974) and to Jackson (What Mary didn't know, 1986)
- ↑ E. Bruce Goldstein (2010). “Something to consider: the mind-body problem”, Sensation and Perception, 8th ed. Cengage Learning, p. 39. ISBN 0495601497.
- ↑ David J Chalmers (1995). "Facing up to the problem of consciousness". Journal of Consciousness Studies 2,: pp. 200-219. Reprinted in David J. Chalmers (1999). “Facing up to the problem of consciousness”, Jonathan Shear, ed: Explaining Consciousness: The Hard Problem. MIT Press, pp. 9 ff. ISBN 026269221X.
- ↑ Eric R. Kandel (2007). “Part Five, §28: Consciousness”, In Search of Memory: The Emergence of a New Science of Mind. W. W. Norton & Company, p. 382. ISBN 0393329372.
- ↑ (2008) Jens Harbecke: Mental Causation: Investigating the Mind's Powers in a Natural World. Ontos Verlag. ISBN 3938793945.