Korea and Japan

Japanese invasions of Korea (1592-1598)

The Japanese invasions of Korea were a major conflict between Japan and the alliance of the China and Korea during the years of 1592 and 1598. The land and naval battles took place almost entirely on the Korean peninsula and its nearby waters, although the Japanese leader Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s main objective in the war was to conquer China. The war consisted of two main invasions from Japan – the first from the years of 1592 and 1593, and the second from 1597 to 1598. The war finally ended during the last months of the year 1598 with the Japanese withdrawal and the naval battle at the straits of Noryang.

The war is known by several other English titles, including the Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea, in context of Hideyoshi’s biography; the Seven Year War, in reference to the war’s duration); and the Imjin War, in reference to the year when the war began - "Imjin" in Korean, in context of the sexagenary cycle. The first invasion (1592–1593) is literally called the "Japanese (= 倭 |wae|) War (= 亂 |ran|) of Imjin" (1592 being an imjin [= water — dragon] year in the sexagenary cycle) in Korean and Bunroku no eki in Japanese (Bunroku referring to the Japanese era under the Emperor Go-Yōzei, spanning the period from 1592 to 1596). The second invasion (1597–1598) is called the "Second War of Jeong-yu" and "Keichō no eki", respectively. In Chinese, the wars are referred to as the "Renchen (the information about the Imjin year also applies here) War to Defend the Nation" or the "Wanli Korean Campaign", after then reigning Chinese emperor.

Initially, the Japanese forces saw successes on land and consistent failures at sea. However, the Japanese forces came to suffer heavily as their communication and supply lines were thinned. The Korean navy starved the Japanese forces by successfully intercepting the Japanese supply fleets on the western waters of the peninsula, to which most major rivers of the Korean peninsula flow. Ming China under Emperor Wanli brought about a military and diplomatic intervention to the conflict, which China understood as a challenge to its tributary system. The war stalled for five years during which the three countries tried to negotiate a peaceful compromise; however, Japan invaded Korea a second time in 1597. The war concluded with the naval battle at Noryang. All of the Japanese forces in Korea had retreated by the 12th lunar month of 1598 and returned to Japan after the devastating defeat against the Korean navy.

In addition to the human losses, Korea suffered tremendous cultural, economic, and infrastructural damage, including a large reduction in the amount of arable land, destruction and confiscation of significant artworks, artifacts, and historical documents, and abductions of artisans and technicians. The heavy financial burden placed on China by the war adversely affected its military capabilities and contributed to the fall of the Ming Dynasty and the rise of the Qing Dynasty. However, the sinocentric tributary system that Ming had defended was restored by Qing, and the normal trade relations between Korea and Japan continued.

Background

East Asia and the Chinese Tributary System

In 1392, the Korean General Yi Seong-gye led a successful coup against King U of the Goryeo Dynasty, and founded Joseon. In search of a justification for its rule given the lack of a royal bloodline, the new regime received recognition from China and integration into its tributary system within the context of the Mandate of Heaven. Under Ashikaga Yoshimitsu's reign during the late 15th century, Japan, too, gained a seat in the tributary system (lost by 1547, see hai jin). Within this tributary system, China assumed the role of a big brother, Korea the middle brother, and Japan the younger brother.

Unlike the situation over a thousand years earlier where Chinese dynasties had an antagonistic relations with the largest of the Korean polities (see ‎List of Chinese invasions of Goguryeo), the Joseon Dynasty had a close trading and diplomatic relations with Ming China, and also a continuous trade relations with Japan. The two dynasties, Ming and Joseon, shared much in common: both emerged during the fourteenth century at the fall of the Mongolian rule, embraced the Confucian ideals in society, and faced similar external threats (the Jurchen raiders and the Japanese Wakō pirates). As for the internal, both China and Korea were troubled with fights among the competing political factions, which would significantly influence the decisions made by the Koreans prior to the war, and those made during the war by the Chinese. Dependence on each other for trade and also having common enemies resulted in Korea and Ming China having a friendly relationship.

Toyotomi Hideyoshi and his preparations

By the last decade of the 16th century, Toyotomi Hideyoshi as daimyō had unified all of Japan in a brief period of peace. Since Hideyoshi came to hold power in presence of a legitimate Japanese imperial line, Hideyoshi sought for military power to legitimize his rule and to decrease his dependence on the imperial authority. It is said that Hideyoshi planned for an invasion of China to fulfill which his late leader Oda Nobunaga dreamed of, and to mitigate the possible threat of civil disorder or rebellion posed by the excess number of samurais and soldiers. But it is quite possible that Hideyoshi might have set a more realistic goal of subjugating the smaller neighbouring states (i.e. Ryukyus, Luzon, Taiwan, and Korea), and treat the large or too distant countries as trading partners: all throughout the invasion of Korea, Hideyoshi sought for legal tally trade with China Hideyoshi's need for military supremacy as a justification to his rule that lacked royal background could, on an international level, translate into a Japanocentric order with Japan's neighbouring countries below Japan. Historian Kenneth M. Swope identifies a rumor relevant to the time that Hideyoshi could have been a Chinese who fled to Japan from the law, and therefore sought revenge against China.

The defeat of the Odawara-based Hōjō clan in 1590 finally brought about the second unification of Japan, and Hideyoshi began preparing for the next war. Beginning in March 1591, the Kyūshū daimyō and their labor forces constructed a castle at Nagoya (in modern-day Karatsu) as the center for the mobilization of the invasion forces.

Hideyoshi planned for a possible war with Korea long before the completing the unification of Japan, and made preparations on many fronts. As early as in 1578, Hideyoshi then battling under Nobunaga against Mōri Terumoto for control of the Chūgoku region of Japan, informed Terumoto of Nobunaga's plan to conquer China. In 1592 Hideyoshi sent a letter to the Philippines threatening the governor general for tribute and stating that Japan had already received tribute from Korea (which was a misunderstanding, as explained below) and the Ryukyus.

As for the military preparations, the construction of as many as 2,000 ships may have begun as early as 1586. To estimate the strength of the Korean military, Hideyoshi sent an assault of 26 ships to the southern coast of Korea in 1587, and he concluded that the Koreans were incompetent. On the diplomatic front, Hideyoshi began to establish friendly relations with China long before completing the unification of Japan and helped to police the trade routes against the wakō.

Diplomatic dealings between Japan and Korea

In 1587, Hideyoshi sent his first envoy Tachibana Yasuhiro, to Korea then under King Seonjo to re-establish diplomatic relations between Korea and Japan (which was broken since a devastating pirate raid in 1555) which Hideyoshi hoped to use as a foundation to induce the Yi Court to join Japan on war against China. Yasuhiro, with his warrior background and an attitude disdainful of the Korean officials in their customs he considered as effeminate, failed to receive the promise of future ambassadorial missions from Korea. Around May 1589, Hideyoshi's second ambassadors consisting of Sō Yoshitoshi (or Yoshitomo), Gensho and Tsuginobu reached Korea and secured the promise of a Korean embassy to Japan in exchange of the Korean rebels having taken refuge in Japan. In fact, in 1587 Hideyoshi had ordered Sō Yoshinori, the father of Yoshitoshi and the daimyō of Tsushima, to offer Joseon the ultimatum to submit to Japan and participate in the conquest of China, or war with Japan. However, as Tsushima enjoyed a special trading position as the single checkpoint to Korea for all Japanese ships and permission from Korea to trade with as many as 50 of its own vessels, the Sō family delayed the talks for nearly two years. Even when Hideyoshi renewed his order, Sō Yoshitoshi reduced the visit to the Yi Court down to a campaign to better relations between the two countries. Near the end of the ambassadorial mission, Yoshitoshi presented King Seonjo a brace of peafowl and matchlock guns - the first advanced fire-arms to come to Korea. Then Yu Seong-ryong, a high-ranking scholar official, suggested that the military put the arquebus into production and use, but the Yi Court failed to cooperate.

On April 1590, the Korean ambassadors including Hwang Yun-gil, Kim Saung-il and others left for Kyoto, where they waited for two months while Hideyoshi was finishing his campaign against the Odawara and the Hōjō clans. Upon his return, they exchanged ceremonial gifts with and delivered King Seonjo's letter to Hideyoshi. As Hideyoshi assumed that the Koreans had come to pay homage as a tributary to Japan, the ambassadors were not given the formal treatment that was due in handling diplomatic matters; at last, the Korean ambassadors asked that Hideyoshi write a reply to the Korean king, for which they waited 20 days at the port of Sakai. The letter, redrafted as requested by the ambassadors on the ground that it was too discourteous, invited Korea to submit to Japan and join the war against China. Upon the ambassadors' return, the Yi Court held serious discussions concerning Japan's invitation; the ambassadors reported to the Yi Court conflicting estimates of Japan's military strength and intention, all of which were lost in the quarrels of competing political factions and ranks. Some, including King Seonjo, argued that Ming should be informed about the dealings with Japan, as failure to do so could make Ming suspect Korea's allegiance, but the Yi Court finally concluded to wait further until the appropriate course of action became definite.

Hideyoshi initiated his diplomacy with Korea under the impression that Korea was a vassal of Tsushima Island, which the Koreans considered theirs; the Yi Court approached Japan as a country inferior to Korea accordingly within the Chinese tributary system, and it expected Hideyoshi's invasions to be no better than the common Wako pirate raids. The Yi Court handed to Gensho and Tairano, Hideyoshi's third embassy, King Seonjo's letter rebuking Hideyoshi for challenging the Chinese tributary system; Hideyoshi replied with a disrespectful letter, but, since it was not presented in person as expected in custom, the Yi Court ignored it. After the denial of his second request, Hideyoshi launched his armies against Korea in 1592. There were internal oppositions to the invasion within Japan's government; among them, Tokugawa Ieyasu, Konishi Yukinaga and Sō Yoshitoshi tried to arbitrate between Hideyoshi and the Joseon court.Template:Fact

Military Capabilities

Hwacha were developed by Koreans and could shoot up to 200 arrows at one time.

The two major security threats to Korea and China at the time were the Jurchens, who raided along the northern borders, and the wakō (Japanese pirates), who pillaged the coastal villages and trade ships. In response to the Jurchens, the Koreans constructed a thorough defense line of fortresses along the Tumen River; in response to the Japanese, the Koreans developed a poweful navy and even took control of the island of Tsushima. This defensive environment of relative peace pushed the Koreans to depend on the heavy artillery of fortresses and warships. China bore a much larger responsibility than Korea as the head of its tributary system and had to make adjustments to all sorts of environments. China was the main source of new military technologies in Asia, and excelled in both cannon manufacturing and shipbuilding. Japan, on the other hand, had been in a state of civil war for over a century, so the military had come to favor the muskets adopted from Portugal over such other weapons. This strategic difference in weapons development and implementation contributed to the in-war Japanese dominance on landd, and the Sino-Korean dominance at sea.

As Japan had been at war since the mid-15th century, Hideyoshi had half a million battle-hardened soldiers at his disposal to form the most professional army in Asia. While Japan's chaotic state had left the Koreans with a very low estimate of Japan as a military threat, A new sense of unity among the different political factions in Japan, and the "Sword Hunt" in 1588, the confiscation of all weapons from the peasants, indicated otherwise. Along with the hunt came “The Separation Edict” in 1591, which effectively put to end all Japanese wakō piracy by prohibiting the daimyōs from supporting the pirates within their fiefs. Ironically enough, the Koreans believed that the Hideyoshi’s invasion would be just an extension of the previous pirate raids that had been repelled before. As for the military situation in Joseon, the Korean scholar official Yu Seong-ryong observed, "not one in a hundred [Korean generals] knew the methods of drilling soldiers": rise in ranks depended far more on social connections than military knowledge. Korean soldiers were disorganized, ill-trained and ill-equipped, and they were used mostly in construction projects such as building castle walls.

Problems with the Korean defense policies

Japanese arquebuses of the Edo era. These types of firearms were used by Japanese soldiers during Hideyoshi's invasions.

There were several defects with the organization of the Korean military. An example was a defense policy that local officers could not individually respond to a foreign invasion outside of their jurisdiction until a higher ranking general, appointed by the king's court, arrived with a newly mobilized army. This arrangement was highly inefficient in that the nearby forces would remain stationary until the mobile border commander arrived to the scene and took control. Secondly, as the appointed general often came from an outside region, he was likely to be unfamiliar with the natural environment, the available technology and manpower of the invaded region. Finally, as a main army was never maintained, new and ill-trained recruits conscripted during war constituted a significant part of the army. The Yi Court managed to carry out some reforms, but even they were problematic. For example, the military training center established in 1589 in the Gyeongsang province recruited mostly the too young or old soldiers (as able men targeted by the policy had higher priorities in farming and other economic activities), augmented by some adventure-seeking aristocrats and slaves buying their freedom.

The dominant form of the Korean fortresses was the "Sanseong", or the mountain fortress, which consisted of a stone wall that continued around a mountain in a serpentine fashion. These walls were poorly designed with little use of towers and cross-fire positions (usually seen in European fortifications) and were mostly low in height. It was a wartime policy for everyone to evacuate to one of these fortresses nearby and for those who failed to do so to be assumed as collaborators with the enemy; however, the policy never gained any effect because the fortresses were out of reach for most refugees.

Troops size

Hideyoshi mobilized his army at the Nagoya castle on Kyūshū, newly built just for the purpose of housing the invasion forces and the reserves. The first invasion consisted of 9 divisions totalling 158,800 men, among which the last two of 21,500 were stationed as reserves in Tsushima and Iki respectively. On the other hand, Joseon maintained only a few military units and no field army, and its defense depended heavily on the mobilization of the citizen soldiers in case of emergency. During the first invasion, Joseon deployed a total of 84,500 regular troops throughout, assisted by 22,000 irregular volunteers. The Chinese aid during the war could not have made up for the difference in numbers since they maintained never more than 80,000 troops in Korea at any point of the war, while the Japanese used a total of 500,000 troops throughout the entire war.

As early as 1582, the Korean scholar official Lee Yul-gok recommended the Yi Court to implement a nationwide expansion of troops up to 100,000, including a conscription of slaves and sons of concubines, after the northern troops performed miserably against a Jurchen attack. However, as Lee was of the Western Faction, the dominant and the competing Eastern Faction (led by Yu Seong-ryong) rejected the proposal. The same result applied to a 1588 proposal from a provincial governor to arm the twenty islands of the southern coast of the peninsula and a proposal in 1590 to fortify the islands around the port city of Busan. Even when the Japanese invasion seemed probable and Yu Seong-ryong switched side on this issue, counter arguments brought purely out of political competition neutralized any gains for those advocating for the expansion of the military.

Weapons

Since its introduction by the Portuguese traders on the island of Tanegashima in 1543, the musket became widely used in Japan. Both Korea and China had already been using firearms similar to the Portuguese arquebus, but the weapon fell into disuse in Korea and the focus for the gunpowder weapons in Korea rested primarily on the artillery and archery. When the Japanese diplomats presented the Yi Court arquebuses as gifts, the Korean scholar official Yu Seong-ryong advocated for the use of the new weapon unsuccessfully.

The Japanese saw a very infrequent use of their katana (curved long sword), which were sharper and longer than the Korean and Chinese counterparts, and relied mostly on the muskets (in combination with their bows) instead.

Large iron-tipped wooden arrow fired from Korean cannons.

The Korean infantry was equipped with one or more of the following personal weapons: swords, spears, tridents and bow-and-arrows. The Koreans used one of the most advanced bows in Asia - the composite reflex bow that had different materials laminated together (composite, the application of different characteristics of the materials for specific designs) with an inward curve (reflex) for maximum effectiveness; its maximum range was 500 yards, compared to the 350 yards for the Japanese bows. The Chinese infantry used a variety of weapons, as they had to deal with many different environments throughout their empire, including bows (mainly crossbows), swords (also for its cavalry), muskets, smoke bombs and hand grenades.

In the early part of the war, the Japanese gained a significant advantage with its monopoly on guns, which had a greater range of 600 yards and penetrating power than the arrows, and which could be fired in concentrated volleys to make up for its lack of accuracy (at both close and long ranges; the bow and arrow, at long range). However, later into the war, the Koreans and Chinese adopted and increased the use of the Japanese muskets.. It has also been claimed that the Chinese developed bullet-proof suits for use during the second invasion.

Both Korea and China deployed their cavalry divisions in action, however with much negative results. The mountainous environment in Korea, which lacked both the flat plains suitable for cavalry charges and the grass essential in feeding the horses, and the Japanese use of muskets at long range and the katana swords in melee combat put cavalry units at a disadvantage.

Korean cavalrymen were equipped with flails and spears (longer than the Japanese swords) for melee combat and bows and arrows for ranged engagement. Most of the cavalry action for the Koreans took place in the Battle of Chungju at the beginning of the war where the they were outnumbered and wiped out by the Japanese infantry. The Japanese divisions included cavalry as well, sometimes equipped with guns designed smaller specifically for use on horseback. The Japanese use of cavalry was reduced by their previous civil war experiences with the use of guns in concentrated volleys.

Armor

Template:Unreferenced While even the common foot soldier in Japan wore chainmail and bamboo armor, Korean soldiers had almost no armor at all.

Korean foot soldiers wore a heavy leather black vest over their common white clothes and a strictly ceremonial felt hat that offered some protection. Other than this, only the elite soldiers stationed at Seoul (the capital) had armor. Korean captains and generals wore chainmail and scale armor, with shoulder, leg and chest plates. Often, a padded piece of leather was worn around the waist for protection as well.

The Korean military believed that the soldiers did not need armor because emphasis was placed on ranged weapons, instead of hand-to-hand combat.

Naval power

An old painting of a panokseon.

The allies' lead in the artillery technology also gave their navies a tremendous advantage. Especially with the complete lack of cannons on the Japanese ships in the first phase of the war, the Korean and Chinese fleets could bombard the Japanese ships while remaining outside of the retaliatory range of the Japanese muskets, arrows, and catapults. Even when the Japanese attempted to add more cannons to their fleet, their lightweight ship design prevented them from placing as many cannons on board as the allies.

There were fundamental design flaws with the Japanese ships: first of all, most of the Japanese ships were merchant ships modified for the transportation of troops; (it should be also noted that fishing vessels made up for much of the Korean navy) second, the Japanese ships each contained a single square sail (effective only in favorable winds) while Korean ships could be powered by both sails and oars. Also, Japanese ships had V-shaped bottoms (also the Chinese ships as well) that were ideal for speed but were less maneuverable than the flat-bottomed panokseons; and fourth, the Japanese ships relied on nails to hold its wood together while the Korean panokseons used wooden pegs, and this difference added onto the Korean advantage because, in water, nails corroded and loosened while wooden pegs expanded and strengthened the joints.

It should be noted that Hideyoshi tried but failed to hire two Portuguese galleons to join the invasion.

First invasion (1592–1593)

"Dong Rae Bu Sun Jaul Do", a Korean painting from 1760 depicting the Battle of Dong-rae.

File:1592invasionmap.png

A map of the first invasion in 1592. Click on this image for details and captions.

The initial attacks

Busan and Tadaejin

On May 23, 1592, the First Division of 7,000 men led by Konishi Yukinaga left Tsushima in the morning, and arrived at the port city of Busan in the evening. The Korean naval intelligence had already detected the Japanese fleet, but Won Gyun, the Right Naval Commander of Gyeongsang, mistook the fleet to consist of trading vessels on a mission. A later report of an arrival of additional 100 Japanese vessels raised his suspicions, but the general did nothing about it. Sō Yoshitoshi landed alone on the Busan shore to ask the Koreans for a safe passage to China for the last time; the Koreans refused, and Sō Yoshitoshi hit the city while Konishi Yukinaga attacked nearby fort of Tadaejin the next morning. Japanese accounts claim that the battles provided the Koreans a complete annihilation (one claims 8,500 deaths, and another, 30,000 heads), while a Korean account claims that the Japanese themselves took significant losses before sacking the city.

Dongnae

On the morning of May 25, 1592, the First Division arrived at the mountain fortress (sanseong) of Dongnae. The fight lasted twelve hours, killed 3,000, and resulted in a Japanese victory. A popular legend describes the governor in charge of the fortress, Song Sang-hyeon. When Konishi Yukinaga again demanded, before the battle, that the Koreans allow the Japanese to travel through the peninsula, the governor replied, "It is easy for me to die, but difficult to let you pass." Even when the Japanese troops during the battle neared his commanding post, Song remained seated with cool dignity. And when a Japanese cut off Song's right arm holding his staff of command, Song picked up the staff with his left arm, which was then cut off; again Song picked it up, this time with his mouth, but was killed by a third blow. The Japanese, impressed by Song's defiance, treated his body with proper burial.

The occupation of the Gyeongsang Province

Katō Kiyomasa's Second Division landed in Busan on May 27, and Kuroda Nagamasa's Third Division, west of Nakdong, on May 28. The Second Division took the abandoned city of Tongdo on May 28, and captured Kyongju on May 30. The Third Division, upon landing, captured the nearby Kimhae castle by keeping the defenders under pressure with the guns while building ramps onto the walls with bundles of crops. By June 3, the Third Division captured Unsan, Changnyong, Hyonpung, and Songju. Meanwhile, Konishi Yukinaga's First Division passed the Yangsan mountain fortress (captured on the night of the Battle of Dongnae, when its defenders fled at the Japanese scout party's fire of their arquebuses), and captured the Miryang castle on the afternoon of May 26. The First Division secured the Chongdo fortress in the next few days, and destroyed the city of Daegu. By June 3, the First Division crossed the Nakdong River, and stopped at the Sonsan mountain.

Joseon response

Upon receiving the news of the Japanese attacks, the Joseon government appointed General Yi Il as the mobile border commander, as was the established policy. General Yi headed to Myongyong near the beginning of the strategically important Choryong pass to gather troops, but he had to travel further south to meet the troops assembled at the city of Daegu. There, General Yi moved all troops back to Sangju, except for the survivors of the Battle of Dongnae who were to be stationed as a rearguard at the Choryong pass.

Battle of Sangju

On April 25, General Yi deployed a force of less than 1,000 men on two small hills to face the nearing First Division. Assuming that a smoke rising was from the burning of buildings by a very nearby Japanese force, General Yi sent sent an officer to scout on a horse; however, when he neared a bridge, the officer was ambushed by a Japanese musket fire from below the bridge, and beheaded. The Korean troops watching him fall were greatly demoralized. Soon the Japanese began the battle with their arquebus; the Koreans replied with their arrows, which fell short of their targets. The Japanese forces, having been divided into three, attacked the Korean lines from both the front and the two flanks; the battle was over with General Yi Il’s retreat and 300 casualties.

Battle of Chungju

General Yi Il then planned to use the Choryong pass, the only path through the western end of the Sobaek mountain range, to check the Japanese advance. However, another commander, Sin Rip, appointed by the Joseon government had arrived to the area with a cavalry division, and moved the total sum of 8,000 combined troops to the Chungju fortress, located above the Choryong pass. General Sin Rip then decided to fight a battle on an open field ideal for the deployment of his cavalry unit, and placed his units on the open fields of Tangeumdae. Furthermore, the general feared that, since the cavalry consisted mostly of new recruits, his troops would flee in battle easily, , and felt the need to trap his forces in the triangular area formed by the convergence of the Talchon and Han rivers in shape of a “Y”. However, the field was dotted with flooded rice paddied, and was not suitable for cavalry action.

On June 5, 1592 the First Division of 18,000 men led by Konishi Yukinaga left Sangju, and reached an abandoned fortress at Mungyong by night. The next day, the First Division arrived at Tangumdae in the early afternoon, where they faced the Korean cavalry unit. Konishi divided his forces into three, and attacked with arquebuses from both flanks and the front. The Korean arrows missed the Japanese troops, outside their range, and General Sin led two charges that failed against the Japanese lines. General Sin then killed himself in the river, and the Koreans that tried to escape by the river either drowned in the river, or were decapitated by the pursuing Japanese.

Capture of Seoul

The Second Division led by Katō Kiyomasa arrived at Chungju, with the Third Division not so far behind. There Katō expressed his anger against Konishi for not waiting at Busan as planned, and attempting to take all of the glory for himself; then Nabeshima Naoshige proposed a compromise of dividing the Japanese troops into two separate routes to Hanseong (the capital and the present-day Seoul), and allowing Katō Kiyomasa to choose the route that the Second Division would take to reach Seoul. The two divisions began the race to capture Hanseong on June 8, and Katō took the shorter route across the Han River while Konishi went further upstream without any waters posing as large barriers. Konishi arrived at Hanseong first on June 10 while the Second Division was halted the river with no boats to cross. The First Division found the castle undefended but its gates tightly locked, as King Seonjo had fled the day before. The Japanese broke into a small floodgate, located in the castle wall, and opened the door capital city gate from the behind. Katō’s Second Division arrived at the capital the next day (by taking the same route as the First Division), and Third and Fourth Divisions the day after. Meanwhile, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions had landed on Busan, with the Ningth Division reserved on the island of Iki.

Parts of Hanseong had already been looted, burnt (i.e. bureaus holding the slave records and the weapons), and abandoned by its inhabitants. General Kim Myong-won in charge of the defenses along the Han River had retreated. The King’s subjects stole the animals in the royal stables and fled before he, leaving the King to rely farm animals.In every village, the King’s party was met by its inhabitants, lined up by the road, grieving that their King was abandoning them, and neglecting their duty of paying homage. Parts of the southern shore of the Imjin River was burnt to deprive the Japanese troops of materials to arrange their crossing with, and General Kim Myong-won deployed 12,000 troops at five points along the river.

Japanese campaigns in the north

The crossing of the Imjin River

While the First Division rested in Hanseong, the Second Division began north, only to be hampered by the Imjin River for two weeks. The Japanese sent a familiar message to the Koreans on the other shore requesting them to open way to China, but the Koreans rejected. Then the Japanese retreated its main forces to the safety of the Paju fortress; the Koreans saw this as a retreat, and launched an attack at dawn against the remaining Japanese troops on the southern shore of the Imjin River. The main Japanese body retaliated against the isolated Korean troops, and acquired their boats; at this, the Korean General Kim Myong-won retreated with his forces to the Kaesong fortress.

The distribution of the Japanese forces in 1592

With the Kaesong castle having been sacked shortly after (General Kim Myong-won retreated to Pyeongyang), the Japanese troops divided their objectives as thus: the First Division would pursue the Korean king in the Pyongan Province in the north (where Pyongyang is located); the Second Division would attack the Hamgyong Province in the northeastern end of Korea; the Sixth Division would attack the Jeolla Province at the southwestern tip of the peninsula; the Fourth Division would secure the Gangwon Province on the midwestern part of the peninsula; and the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Divisions would stabilize the following provinces respectively: the Hwanghae Province (below the Pyongan Province), Chungchon Province (below the Kyonggi Province); Gyeongsang Province (southeastern part where the Japanese first landed); and the Gyeonggi Province (where the capital city is located).

Capture of Pyeongyang

The First Division under Konishi Yukinaga progressed up north, and sacked Pyongsan, Sohung, Pungsan, Hwangju, and Chunghwa on the way. At Chunghwa, the Third Division under Kuroda Nagamasa joined the First, and continued to the city of Pyeongyang located behind the Taedong River. 10,000 troops guarded the city against the 30,000 Japanese troops under the various commands including the General Yi Il and Kim Myong-won, and their defense preparations made sure that no boats were available for Japanese use.

On the night of July 22, 1592, the Koreans silently crossed the river and launched a successful surprise attack against the Japanese encampment. However, this stirred up the rest of the Japanese army, which took the rear of the Korean positions and destroyed the reinforcements crossing the river. Then the rest of the Korean troops retreated back to Pyeongyang, and the Japanese troops gave up their pursuit against the Koreans to observe the way the Koreans crossed the river.

The next day, the Japanese began sending troops to the other shore over the shallow points in the river, in a systematical manner, and at this the Koreans abandoned the city over the night. On July 24, the First and Third Divisions entered the deserted city of Pyeongyang.

Campaigns in the Gangwon Province

The Fourth Division under the command of Mōri Yoshinari set out eastward from the capital city of Hanseong in July, and captured the fortresses down the eastern coast from Anbyon to Samchok. The division then turned inward to capture Chongson, Yongwol, and Pyongchang, and settled down at the provincial capital of Wonju. There Mōri Yoshinari established a civil administration, systematized social ranks according to the Japanese model, and conducted land surveys. Shimazu Yoshihiro, one of the generals in the Fourth Division, arrived to Gangwon lately due to the Umekita Rebellion, and finished the campagin by securing Chunchon.

Campaigns in the Hamgyong Province and Manchuria

Katō Kiyomasa led the Second Division of more than 20,000 men went across the peninsula to Anbyon within ten days' march, and swept north along the eastern coast. Among the castles captured was Hamhung, the provincial capital of the Hamgyong Province, and here a part of the Second Division was allocated for defense and civil administration.

The rest of the division at 10,000 men continued north, and fought a battle on August 23 against the southern and northern Hamgyong armies under the commands of Yi Yong and Han Kuk-ham at Songjin (present-day Kimchaek). A Korean cavalry division took advantage of the open field at Songjin, and pushed the Japanese forces into a grain storehouse. There the Japanese barricaded themselves with bales of rice, and successfully repelled off a formation charge from the Korean forces with their arquebuses. While the Koreans planned to renew the battle in the morning, the Katō Kiyomasa ambushed them at night; the Second Division completely surrounded the Koreans forces with the exception of an opening leading to a swamp. Here, those that fled were trapped and slaughtered.

Koreans who fled gave alarms to the other garrisons, allowing the Japanese troops to easily capture Kilchu, Myongchon, and Kyongson. The Second Division then turned inland through Puryong toward Hoeryong where two Korean princes had taken refuge. And on August 30, 1592, the Second Division entered into Hoeryong where Katō Kiyomasa received the Korean princes and the provincial governor Yu Yong-rip, having already been captured by the local inhabitants. Shortly afterward, a Korean warrior band handed over the head of an anonymous Korean general, and the General Han Kuk-ham tied up in ropes.

Katō Kiyomasa then decided to attack a nearby Jurchen castle across the Tumen River in Manchuria to test his troops against the “barbarians”, as the Koreans called the Jurchens (“oranke” in Korean and “orangai” in Japanese – the Japanese derived both the word and the concept of the Jurchens as barbarians from the Koreans). The Koreans with 3,000 men at Hamgyong joined in (with Kato’s army of 8,000), as the Jurchens periodically raided them across the border. Soon the combined force sacked the castle, and camped near the border; after the Koreans left home, the Japanese troops received a retaliatory assault from the Jurchens. Despite having the advantage, Katō Kiyomasa retreated with his forces to avoid heavy losses.

The Second Division continued east, capturing the fortresses of Chongsong, Onsong, Kyongwon, and Kyonghung, and finally arrived at Sosupo on the estuary of the Tumen River. There the Japanese rested on the beach, and watched a nearby volcanic island rising on the horizon that they mistook as Mount Fuji. After the tour, the Japanese continued their previous efforts to bureaucratize and administrate the province, and allowed several garrisons to be handled by the Koreans themselves.

The naval battles of Admiral Yi

Having secured Pyeongyang, the Japanese planned to cross the Yalu River into China, and use the waters west of the Korean peninsula to supply the invasion. However, Yi Sun-sin, who held the post of the Left Naval Commander (equivalent of "Admiral” in English) of the Jeolla Province (which covers the western waters of Korea), successfully destroyed the Japanese ships transporting troops and supplies. Thus the Japanese, now lacking enough arms and troops to carry on an invasion into China, changed their objective of the war to the occupation of Korea.

When the Japanese troops hit the port of Busan, Bak (also spelled Park) Hong, the Left Naval Commander of the Gyeongsang Province, destroyed his entire fleet, his base, and all armaments and provisions, and fled. Won Gyun, the Right Naval Commander, also destroyed and abandoned his own base, and fled to Konyang with only four ships. Therefore, there was no Korean navy active around the Gyeongsang Province, and the surviving two, out of the total four, navies were active only on the other side of the peninsula. Admiral Won later sent a message to Admiral Yi that he had fled to Konyang after being overwhelmed by the Japanese in a fight. A messenger was sent by Admiral Yi to the nearby island of Namhae to give Yi’s order for war preparations, only to find it pillaged and abandoned by its own inhabitants. As soldiers began to flee secretly, Admiral Yi ordered “to arrest the escapees and had two of the fugitives brought back, beheaded them and had their heads exposed”.

Battle of Okpo

Admiral Yi relied on a network of local fishermen and scouting boats to receive intelligence of the enemy movements. On the dawn of June 13, 1592, Admiral Yi and Admiral Yi Ok-gi set sail with 24 Panokseons, 15 small warships, and 46 boats (i.e. fishing boats), and arrived the waters of the Gyeongsang Province by sunset. Next day, the Jeolla fleet sailed to the arranged location where Admiral Won was supposed to meet them, and met the admiral on June 15. The augmented flotilla of 91 ships then began circumnavigating the Gojae Island for the island of Gadok, but scouting vessels detected 50 Japanese vessels at the Okpo harbor. Upon sighting the approaching Korean fleet, some of the Japanese who had been busying themselves with plundering got back to their ships, and began to flee. At this, the Korean fleet encircled the Japanese ships and finished them with its artillery bombardments. The Koreans spotted 5 more Japanese vessels by the night, and managed to destroy four. The next day, the Koreans approached 13 Japanese ships at Chokjinpo as reported by the intelligence. In the same manner as the previous success at Okpo, the Korean fleet destroyed 11 Japanese ships – completing the Battle of Okpo without a loss of a single ship.

A turtle ship replica at the military museum in Seoul.

Battle of Sachon and the Turtle Ship

About three weeks after the Battle of Okpo, Admirals Yi and Won sailed with a total of 26 ships (23 under Admiral Yi) toward the Bay of Sachon upon receiving an intelligence report of the Japanese presence. Admiral Yi had left behind his fishing vessels that used to make up for most of his fleet in favor of his newly completed Turtle ship.

The Turtle Ship (called “Gaubooksaun” in Korean) was a vessel of a Panokseon design with the removal of the elevated command post, the modification of the gunwales into curved walls, and the addition of a roof covered in iron spikes (and hexagonal iron plates, which is disputed). Its walls contained a total of 36 cannon ports, and also openings, above the cannons, through which the ship’s crew members could look out and fire their personal arms. This design also prevented the outsiders from boarding the ship and aiming at the personnel inside. The ship was the fastest existing warship in the East Asian theater, as it was powered by two sails and 80 oarsmen taking turns to handle the ship’s 16 oars. No more than 6 Turtle Ships served throughout the entire war, and their primary role was to cut deep into the enemy lines, cause havoc with its cannons, and destroy the enemy flag ship.

On July 8, 1592, the fleet arrived at the Bay of Sachon, where the outgoing tide prevented the Korean fleet from entering. Therefore, Admiral Yi ordered for the fleet to fake withdrawal, which the Japanese commander observed from his tent on a rock. Then the Japanese hurriedly embarked their 12 ships and pursued the Korean fleet. The Korean navy counterattacked, with the Turtle Ship in the front, and successfully destroyed all 12 ships. Admiral Yi was shot by a bullet on his left shoulder, but survived.

Battle of Dangpo

On July 10, 1592, the Korean fleet again found and destroyed an enemy fleet, at a total of 21 ships, anchored while the Japanese were raiding a coastal town.

Battle of Danghangpo

Admiral Yi Ok-gi with his fleet joined Admirals Yi Sun-sin and Won Gyun, and participated in a search for enemy vessels in the Gyonsang waters. On July 13, the generals received an intelligence from the local boatmen that a group of Japanese ships including those that escaped from the Battle of Dangpo was resting in the Bay of Danghangpo. Having traveled through a narrow gulf, the Koreans sighted a total of 26 enemy vessels in the bay. The Turtle Ship penetrated into the enemy formation and rammed the flagship, while the rest of the Korean fleet held back. Then Admiral Yi ordered for a fake retreat, as the Japanese could escape to land while in the bay. When the Japanese pursued the Koreans far enough, the Korean fleet turned and surrounded the Japanese fleet, with the Turtle Ship again ramming against the enemy flag ship. Only 1 Japanese ship managed to escape from the defeat, and that too was caught and destroyed by a Korean ship the next morning.

Admiral Yi's crane wing formation.

Battle of Yulpo

On July 15, the Korean fleet was sailing east to return to the island of Gadok, and successfully intercepted 7 Japanese ships coming out from the Yulpo harbor and escaping to the city of Busan.

Battle of Hansando

In response to the Korean navy’s success, Toyotomi Hideyoshi recalled from land-based activities his three admirals: Wakizaka Yasuharu, Kato Yoshiaki, and Kuki Yoshitaka. They were the only ones with naval responsibilities in the entirety of the Japanese invasion forces. However, the admirals arrived in Busan 9 days before Hideyoshi’s order was actually issued, and assembled a squadron to counter the Korean navy. Eventually Admiral Wakizaka completed his preparations, and his eagerness to win military honor pushed him to launch an attack against the Koreans without waiting for the other admirals to finish.

The combined Korean navy of 70 ships under the commands of Admiral Yi Sun-sin, Yi Ok-gi, and Won Gyun was carrying out a search-and-destroy operation because the Japanese troops on land were advancing into the Jeolla Province. The Jeolla Province was the only Korean territory to be untouched by a major military action, and served as home for the three admirals and the only active Korean naval force. The admirals perceived it best to destroy the naval support for the Japanese to reduce the effectiveness of the enemy ground troops.

On August 13, 1592, the Korean fleet sailing from the Miruk Island at Tangpo received a local intelligence that a large Japanese fleet was nearby. The following morning, the Korean fleet spotted the Japanese fleet of 82 vessels anchored in the straits of Gyeonnaeryang. Because of the narrowness of the strait and the hazard posed by the underwater rocks, Admiral Yi sent 6 ships to lure out 63 Japanese vessels into the wider sea, and the Japanese fleet followed. There the Japanese fleet was surrounded by the Korean fleet in a semicircular formation called “crane wing” by Admiral Yi. With at least 3 Turtle Ships (of which 2 were just built) spearheading the clash against the Japanese fleet, the Korean vessels fired volleys of cannonballs into the Japanese formation. Then the Korean ships engaged in a free-for-all battle with the Japanese ships, maintaining enough distance to prevent the Japanese from boarding; Admiral Yi permitted melee combats only against severely damaged Japanese ships. The battle ended in Korean victory, with Japanese losses of 59 ships – 47 destroyed and 12 captured. Several Korean prisoners of war were rescued by the Korean soldiers throughout the fight. Admiral Wakisaka escaped due to the speed of his flag ship. When the news of the defeat at the Battle of Hansando reached Toyotomi Hideyoshi, he ordered that the Japanese invasion forces should cease all naval operations.

Battle of Angolpo

On August 16, 1592, Yi Sun-sin and Won Gyun led their fleet to the harbor of Angolpo where 42 Japanese vessels were docked. When Admiral Yi tried to fake a retreat, the Japanese ships did not follow; in response, Admiral Yi ordered for the Korean ships to take turn bombarding the Japanese vessels. In fear that the Japanese troops would take revenge for their losses against the local inhabitants, Admiral Yi ordered the Korean ships to cease fire against the few remaining enemy vessels.

Korean Militias

Since the beginning of the war, the Koreans organized militias called the "Righteous Army" (의병) to resist the Japanese invasion. These fighting bands spurred throughout the country, and participated in battles, guerilla raids, sieges, and the transportation and construction of the wartime necessities.

There were three main types of Korean militias during the war: first, the surviving and leaderless Korean regular soldiers; second, the “Righteous Armies” (Uibyong in Korean) consisting of patriotic yangbans (aristocrats) and commoners; and third, the Buddhist monks.

During the first invasion, the Cholla Province remained the only untouched area on the Korean peninsula. In addition to the successful patrols of the sea by Admiral Yi, volunteer activism pressured the Japanese troops from avoiding the province for other priorities.

Gwak Jae-u's Campaigns along the Nakdong River

Gwak Jae-u was a famous leader in the Korean militia movement, and it is widely accepted that he was the first to form a resistance group against the Japanese invaders. He was a land-owner in the town of Uiryong situated by the Nam River in the Gyeongsang Province. As the Korean regulars abandoned the town and an attack seemed imminent, Gwak organized fifty townsmen; however the Third Division went from Changwon straight toward Songju. When Gwak used abandoned government storages to supply his army, the Gyeongsang Province Governor Kim Su branded Gwak's group as rebels, and ordered that it be disbanded. When the general asked for help from other landowners, and sent a direct appeal to the King, the governor sent troops against Gwak, in spite of having enough troubles already with the Japanese. However, an official from the capital city then arrived to raise troops in the province, and, since the official lived nearby and actually knew him, he saved Gwak from troubles with the governor.

Gwak Jae-u deployed his troops in guerilla warfare under the cover of the tall reeds on the union of the Nakdong and the Nam Rivers. This strategy prevented easy access for the Japanese troops to the Jeolla Province where Admiral Yi and his fleet were stationed.

Battle of Uiryong/Chongjin

The Sixth Division under the command of Kobayakawa Takakage was in charge of conquering the Jeolla Province. The Sixth Division marched to Songju through the established Japanese route (i.e. the Third Division, above), and cut left to Kumsan in Chungchong, which Kobayakawa secured as his starting base for his invasion into the province.

Ankokuji Ekei, a former Buddhist monk made into a general due to his role in the negotiations between Mōri Terumoto and Toyotomi hideyoshi, led the units of the Sixth Division assigned with the invasion of the Jeolla Province. The units began their march to Uiryong at Changwon, and arrived at the Narm River. Ankokuji’s scouts planted meters measuring the river’s depths so that the entire squadron could cross the river; over the night, the Korean militiamen moved the meters into the deeper parts of the river. As the Japanese troops began to cross, Gwak’s militia ambushed them, and caused heavy losses for the Japanese. In the end, to advance into the Jeolla Province, Ankokuji’s men had to try going north around the insecure grounds and within the security of the Japanese-garrisoned fortresses. At Kaenyong, Ankokuji’s target was changed to Gochang, to be taken with the aid of Kobayakawa Takakage. However, the entire Jeolla campaign was then abandoned when Kim Myon and his guerillas successfully ambushed Ankokuji’s troops by firing arrows from hidden positions within the mountains.

The Jeolla coalition & the Battle of Yong-in

When the Japanese troops were advancing to Hanseong (present-day Seoul), the Yi Kwang, the governor of the Jeolla Province, attempted to check the Japanese progress by launching his army toward the capital city. Upon hearing the news that the capital had already been sacked, the governor retreated his army. However, as the army grew in size to 50,000 men with its accumulation of several volunteer forces, Yi Kwang and the irregular commanders reconsidered their aim to reclaim Hanseong, and led the combined forces north to Suwon, 26 miles (42 km) south of Hanseong. On June 4, an advance guard of 1,900 men attempted to take the nearby fortress at Yong-in, but the 600 Japanese defenders under Admiral Wakizaka Yasuharu avoided engagement with the Koreans until the June 5, when the main Japanese troops came to rescue the fortress. The Japanese troops counterattacked successfully against the Jeolla coalition, forcing the Koreans to abandon arms and retreat.

The First Geumsan Campaign

Around the time of General Kwak's mobilization of his volunteer army in the Gyeongsang Province, Go Gyung-myung at the Jeolla Province formed a volunteer force of 6,000 men. Go then tried to combine his forces with another militia in the Chungchong Province, but upon crossing the provincial border he heard that Kobayakawa Takakage of the Sixth Division launched an attack to Jeonju (the capital of the Jeolla Province) from the mountain fortress at Geumsan, Go returned to his own province. Having joined forces with General Gwak Yong, Go then led his soldiers to Geumsan. There, on July 10, the volunteer forces fought with a Japanese army retreating to Geumsan after a defeat at the Battle of Ichi two days earlier on July 8

Battle of Haengju

File:Battle of Haengju.jpg

A contemporary painting of the Battle of Haengju. Note the hwacha used.

The Japanese invasion into Jeolla province was broken down and pushed back by General Gwon Yul at the hills of Ichiryeong, where outnumbered Koreans fought overwhelming Japanese troops and gained victory. Gwon Yul quickly advanced northwards, re-taking Suwon and then swung south toward Haengju where he would wait for the Chinese reinforcements. After he got the message that the Koreans were annihilated at Byeokje, Gwon Yul decided to fortify Haengju.

Bolstered by the victory at Byeokje, Katō and his army of 30,000 men advanced to the south of Hanseong to attack Haengju Fortress, an impressive mountain fortress that overlooked the surrounding area. An army of a few thousand led by Gwon Yul was garrisoned at the fortress waiting for the Japanese. Katō believed his overwhelming army would destroy the Koreans and therefore ordered the Japanese soldiers to simply advance upon the steep slopes of Haengju with little planning. Gwon Yul answered the Japanese with fierce fire from the fortification using Hwachas, rocks, handguns, and bows. After nine massive assaults and 10,000 casualties, Katō burned his dead and finally pulled his troops back.

The Battle of Haengju was an important victory for the Koreans, as it greatly improved the morale of the Korean army. The battle is celebrated today as one of the three most decisive Korean victories; Battle of Haengju, Siege of Jinju (1592), and Battle of Hansando.

Today, the site of Haengju fortress has a memorial built to honor Gwon Yul.

Siege of Jinju

Jinju (진주) was a large castle that defended Jeolla Province. The Japanese commanders knew that control of Jinju would mean the fall of Jeolla. Therefore, a large army under Hosokawa Tadaoki gleefully approached Jinju. Jinju was defended by Kim Si-min (김시민), one of the better generals in Korea, commanding a Korean garrison of 3,000 men. Kim had recently acquired about 200 new arquebuses that were equal in strength to the Japanese guns. With the help of arquebuses, cannon, and mortars, Kim and the Koreans were able to drive back the Japanese from Jeolla Province. Hosokawa lost over 30,000 men. The battle at Jinju is considered one of the greatest victories of Korea because it prevented the Japanese from entering Jeolla.

In 1593, Jinju would fall to the Japanese.

Intervention of Ming China

China sent land and naval forces to Korea in both the first and second invasions to assist in defeating the Japanese.

After the fall of Pyongyang, King Seonjo retreated to Uiju, a small city near the border of China. With the First and Second Divisions rapidly approaching, King Seonjo made another desperate retreat into China. At the Chinese court, King Seonjo informed of the Japanese invasion.

The Ming Dynasty Emperor Wanli and his advisers responded to King Seonjo's request for aid by sending an inadequately small force of 5,000 soldiers. These troops provided almost no help however.

As a result, the Ming Emperor sent a large force in January 1593 under two generals, Song Yingchang and Li Rusong. The salvage army had a prescribed strength of 100,000, made up of 42,000 from five northern military districts and a contingent of 3,000 soldiers proficient in the use of firearms from South China. The Ming army was also well armed with artillery pieces.

In February 1593, a large force of Chinese soldiers meet up outside of Pyongyang with a group of Korean militas. By King Seonjo's decree, Ming general Li Rusong was appointed the supreme commander of armies in Korea. Li then led the allied troops to victory in the bloody siege of Pyongyang and drove the Japanese into eastward retreat. Overconfident of his recent success, Li Rusong personally led a pursuit with over 20,000 strong mounted troops, along with a small force of Koreans, but was ambushed near Pyokje by a large Japanese formation. Li escaped when his brother's relief force saved the cavalry.

In late February, Li ordered a raid into the Japanese rear and burned several hundred thousand koku of military rice supply, forcing the Japanese invading army to retreat from Seoul due to the prospect of food shortage.

These engagements ended the first phase of the war, and peace negotiations followed. Some Japanese soldiers abandoned the army and settled down in Korea. The Japanese evacuated Hanseong in May and retreated to fortifications around Busan. An uneasy truce was lasted about four years.

Negotiations and truce between China and Japan (1594–1596)

Under pressure from the Chinese army and local guerrillas, with food supplies cut off and his forces now reduced by nearly one third from desertion, disease and death, Konishi was compelled to sue for peace. General Li Rusong offered General Konishi a chance to negotiate an end to the hostilities. When negotiations got underway in the spring of 1593, China and Korea agreed to cease hostilities if the Japanese would withdraw from Korea altogether. General Konishi had no option but to accept the terms, but he would have a hard time convincing Hideyoshi that he had no other choice.

Hideyoshi proposed to China the division of Korea: the north as a self-governing Chinese satellite, and the south to remain in Japanese hands. The peace talks were mostly carried out by Konishi Yukinaga, who did most of the fighting against the Chinese. The offer was taken into consideration until Hideyoshi also demanded one of Chinese princesses to be sent as his concubine. Then the offer was promptly rejected. These negotiations were kept secret from the Korean Royal Court, which had no say in the negotiations.

By May 18, 1593, all the Japanese soldiers had retreated back to Japan. In the summer of 1593, a Chinese delegation visited Japan and stayed at the court of Hideyoshi for more than a month. The Ming government withdrew most of its expeditionary force, but kept 16,000 men on the Korean peninsula to guard the truce.

An envoy from Hideyoshi reached Beijing in 1594. Most of the Japanese army had left Korea by the autumn of 1596; a small garrison nevertheless remained in Busan. Satisfied with the Japanese overtures, the imperial court in Beijing dispatched an embassy to allow Hideyoshi to have the title of "King of Japan" on condition of complete withdrawal of Japanese forces from Korea.

The Ming ambassador met Hideyoshi in October 1596 but there was a great deal of misunderstanding about the context of the meeting. Hideyoshi was enraged to learn that China insulted the Emperor of Japan by presuming to cancel the Emperor's divine right to the throne, offering to recognize Hideyoshi instead. To insult the Chinese, he demanded among other things, a royal marriage with the Wanli Emperor's daughter, the delivery of a Korean prince as hostage, and four of Korea's southern provinces.

Peace negotiations soon broke down and the war entered its second phase when Hideyoshi sent another invasion force. Early in 1597, both sides resumed hostilities.

Korean military reorganization

Proposal for military reforms

During the period between the First and Second invasions, the Korean government had a chance to examine the reasons why they had been easily overrun by the Japanese. Yu Seong-ryong, the Prime Minister, spoke out about the Korean disadvantage.

Yu pointed out that Korean castle defences were extremely weak, a fact which he had already pointed out before the war. He noted how Korean castles had incomplete fortifications and walls that were too easy to scale. He also wanted cannons set up in the walls. Yu proposed building strong towers with gun turrets for cannons. Besides castles, Yu wanted to form a line of defences in Korea. He proposed to create a series of walls and forts, all enveloping Seoul in the center.

Yu also pointed out how efficient the Japanese army was, in that it took them only one month to reach Seoul, and how well trained they were. The organized military units the Japanese generals deployed were a large part of the Japanese success.Template:Verify source Yu noted how the Japanese moved their units in complex maneuvers, often weakening the enemy with arquebuses, then attacking with melee weapons. Korean armies often moved forward as one body without any organization.

Military Training Agency

King Seonjo and the Korean court finally began to reform the military. In September 1593, the Military Training Agency was established. The agency carefully divided the army into units and companies. Within the companies were squads of archers, arquebusers, and edged-weapon users. The agency set up divisional units in each region of Korea and garrisoned battalions at castles. The agency, which originally had less than 80 members, soon grew to about 10,000.

One of the most important changes was that both upper class citizens and slaves were subject to the draft. All males had to enter military service to be trained and familiarized with weapons.

The creation of the Military Training Agency was halfhearted and under-developed. In addition, nearly all the reforms Yu had called for were again ignored. The lack of manpower and a devastated economy put Korea in nearly the same position as in the first invasion. Although the second invasion was quickly repelled with the help of China, Korea ultimately failed to reform the military.

Second invasion (1597–1598)

Hideyoshi was dissatisfied with the first campaign and decided to attack Korea again. One of the main differences between the first and second invasions was that conquering China was no longer a goal for the Japanese. Failing to gain a foothold during Katō Kiyomasa's Chinese campaign and the full retreat of the Japanese during the first invasion affected Japanese morale. Hideyoshi and his generals instead planned to conquer Korea.

Instead of the nine divisions during the earlier invasion, the armies invading Korea were divided into the Army of the Left and the Army of the Right, consisting of about 49,600 men and 30,000 respectively.

Soon after the Chinese ambassadors returned safely to China in 1597, Hideyoshi sent 200 ships with approximately 141,100 men under the overall command of Kobayakawa Hideaki. Japan's second force arrived unopposed on the southern coast of Gyeongsang Province in 1596. However, the Japanese found that Korea was both better equipped and ready to deal with an invasion this time. In addition, upon hearing this news in China, the imperial court in Beijing appointed Yang Hao (楊鎬) as the supreme commander of an initial mobilization of 55,000 troops from various (and sometimes remote) provinces across China, such as Sichuan, Zhejiang, Huguang, Fujian, and Guangdong. A naval force of 21,000 was included in the effort. Rei Huang, a Chinese historian, estimated that the combined strength of the Chinese army and navy at the height of the second campaign was around 75,000. Korean forces totaled 30,000 with General Gwon Yul's army in Gong Mountain (공산; 公山) in Daegu, General Gwon Eung's (권응) troops in Gyeongju, Gwak Jae-u's soldiers in Changnyeong (창녕), Yi Bok-nam’s (이복남) army in Naju, and Yi Si-yun's troops in Chungpungnyeong.

Initial offensive

Initially the Japanese found little success, being confined mainly to Gyeongsang Province and only managing numerous short-range attacks to keep the much larger Korean and Chinese forces off balance. All throughout the second invasion Japan would mainly be on the defensive and locked in at Gyeongsang province. The Japanese planned to attack Jeolla Province in the southwestern part of the peninsula and eventually occupy Jeonju, the provincial capital. Korean success in the Siege of Jinju in 1592 had saved this area from further devastation during the first invasion. Two Japanese armies, under Mōri Hidemoto and Ukita Hideie, began the assault in Busan and marched towards Jeonju, taking Sacheon and Changpyong along the way.

Siege of Namwon

Namwon was located 30 miles southeast of Jeonju. It was the largest fortress in Jeolla Province,Template:Fact and a coalition force of 6,000 soldiers (including 3,000 Chinese) and civilian volunteers were readied to fight the approaching Japanese forces. The Japanese laid siege to the walls of the fortress with ladders and siege towers. The two sides exchanged volleys of arquebuses and bows. Eventually the Japanese forces scaled the walls and sacked the fortess. According to Japanese commander Okochi Hidemoto, author of the Chosen Ki, the Siege of Namwon resulted in 3,726 casualties on the Korean and Chinese forces' side. The entire Jeolla Province fell under Japanese control, but as the battle raged on the Japanese found themselves hemmed in on all sides in a retreat and again positioned in a defensive perimeter only around Gyeongsang Province.

Battle of Hwangseoksan

Hwangseoksan Fortress consisted of extensive walls that circumscribed the Hwangseok mountain and garrisoned thousands of soldiers led by the general Jo Jong-do and Gwak Jun. When Katō Kiyomasa laid siege to the mountain with a large army, the Koreans lost morale and retreated with 350 casualties. Even with this incident the Japanese were still unable to break free from Gyeongsang Province and were reduced to holding a defensive position only, with constant attacks from the Chinese and Korean forces.

Korean naval operations (1597–1598)

A naval battle. Close combat was very rare during Admiral Yi's operations.

The Korean navy played a crucial part in the second invasion, as in the first. The Japanese advances were halted due to the lack of reinforcements and suppliesTemplate:Fact as the naval victories of the Korean navy prevented the Japanese from accessing the south-western side of the Korean peninsula. Also, during the second invasion, China sent a large number of Chinese ships to aid the Koreans. This made the Korean navy an even bigger threat to the Japanese, since they had to fight a larger enemy fleet.

Plot against Admiral Yi

The war at sea took off on a bad start when Won Gyun took Admiral Yi's place as commander.

Because Admiral Yi, the commander of the Korean navy, was so able in naval warfare, the Japanese plotted to demote him by making use of the laws that governed the Korean military. A Japanese double agent working for the Koreans falsely reported that Japanese General Katō Kiyomasa would be coming on a certain date with a great Japanese fleet in another attack on Korean shores, and insisted that Admiral Yi be sent to lay an ambush.

Knowing that the area had sunken rocks detrimental to the ships, Admiral Yi refused, and he was demoted and jailed by King Seonjo for refusing orders. On top of this, Admiral Won Gyun accused Admiral Yi of drinking and idling. Won Gyun was quickly put in Admiral Yi's place. The replacement of Admiral Yi by Admiral Won would soon bring the destruction of the Korean navy at Chilchonryang.

Battle of Chilchonryang

After Won Gyun replaced Admiral Yi, Won Gyun gathered the entire Korean fleet, which now had more than 100 ships carefully accummulated by Admiral Yi, outside of Yosu to search for the Japanese. Without any previous preparations or planning, Won Gyun had his fleet sail towards Busan.

After one day, Won Gyun was informed of a large Japanese fleet near Busan. He decided to attack immediately, although captains complained of the exhausted soldiers.

At the Battle of Chilchonryang, Won Gyun was completely outmaneuvered by the Japanese in a surprise attack. His ships were overwhelmed by arquebuse fire and the Japanese traditional boarding attacks. Eventually, the battle destroyed the entire Korean fleet. However, before the battle, Bae Soel, an officer ran away with 13 Panokseons, the entire fighting force of the Korean navy for many months.

The Battle of Chilchonryang is Japan's only naval victory of the war. Won Gyun was killed after he struggled ashore and subsequently killed by a Japanese garrison.

Battle of Myeongnyang

After the debacle in Chilcheollyang, King Seonjo immediately reinstated Admiral Yi. Admiral Yi quickly returned to Yeosu only to find his entire navy destroyed. Yi re-organized the navy, now reduced to 12 ships and 200 men from the previous battle. Nonetheless, Admiral Yi's strategies did not waver, and on September 16, 1597, he led the small Korean fleet against a Japanese fleet of 300 war vessels in the Myeongnyang Strait. The Battle of Myeongnyang resulted in a Korean victory with at least 133 Japanese vessels sunk, and the Japanese were forced to return to Busan, under the orders of Mōri Hidemoto. Admiral Yi won back the control of the Korean shores. The Battle of Myeongnyang is considered Admiral Yi's greatest battle because of the disparity of numbers.

Siege of Ulsan

Korean and Chinese soldiers assault the Japanese-built fortress at Ulsan.

By late 1597, the Joseon and Ming allied forces achieved victory in Jiksan and pushed the Japanese further south. After the news of the loss at Myeongnyang, Katō Kiyomasa and his retreating army decided to destroy Gyeongju, the former capital of Unified Silla.

Eventually, Japanese forces sacked the city and many artifacts and temples were destroyed, most prominently, the Bulguksa, a Buddhist temple. However Joseon and Ming allied forces repulsed the Japanese forces who retreated south to Ulsan, a harbor that had been an important Japanese trading post a century before, and which Katō had chosen as a strategic stronghold.

Yet Admiral Yi's control of the areas over the Korea Strait permitted no supply ships to reach the western side of the Korean peninsula, into which many extensive tributaries merge. Without provisions and reinforcements, the Japanese forces had to remain in the coastal fortresses known as wajō that they still controlled. To gain advantage of the situation, the Chinese and Korean coalition forces attacked Ulsan. This siege was the first major offensive from the Chinese and Korean forces in the second phase of the war.

The effort of the Japanese garrison (about 7,000 men) of Ulsan was largely dedicated to its fortification in preparation for the expected attack. Katō Kiyomasa assigned command and defense of the base to Katō Yasumasa, Kuki Hirotaka, Asano Nagayoshi, and others before proceeding to Sosaengpo. The Chinese Ming troops' first assault on January 29, 1598, caught the Japanese army unawares and still encamped, for the large part, outside Ulsan's unfinished walls.

A total of around 36,000 troops with the help of singijeons and hwachas nearly succeeded in sacking the fortress, but reinforcements under the overall command of Mōri Hidemoto came across the river to aid the besieged fortress and prolonged the hostilities. Later, the Japanese troops were running out of food and victory was imminent for the allied forces, but Japanese reinforcements arrived from the rear of the Chinese and Korean troops and forced them to a stalemate. After several losses, however, Japan's position in Korea had significantly weakened.

Battle of Sacheon

During the autumn of 1597, the Korean and Chinese allies repelled the Japanese forces from reaching Jiksan (present-day Cheonan). Without any hope of conquering Korea, the Japanese commanders prepared to retreat. From the beginning of spring in 1598, the Korean forces and 100,000 Chinese soldiers began to retake castles on the coastal areas. The Wanli Emperor of China sent a fleet under the artillery expert Chen Lin in May 1598; this naval force saw action in joint operations with the Koreans against the Japanese navy. In June 1598, under Commander Konishi Yukinaga's warning of the dire situations in the campaign, 70,000 troops were withdrawn and 60,000 troops were left behind — mostly Satsuma soldiers under the Shimazu clan commanders Shimazu Yoshihiro and his son Tadatsune. The remaining Japanese forces fought desperately, turning back Chinese attacks on Suncheon and Sacheon.

The Chinese believed that Sacheon was crucial in their program to retake the lost castles and ordered an attack. Although the Chinese were ascendant initially, the tide of battle turned when Japanese reinforcements attacked the rear of the Chinese army and the Japanese soldiers inside the fortress counter-attacked through the gates. The Chinese Ming forces retreated with 30,000 losses. However, numerous assaults on the Japanese position in the coastal fortresses weakened the Japanese forces and were barely controlling the coastal areas.

Death of Hideyoshi

On September 18, 1598, Hideyoshi ordered the withdrawal of forces from Korea on his deathbed . The Council of Five Elders made a secret of Hideyoshi's death to preserve morale and sent the decree in late October to the Japanese commanders to withdraw.

Battle of Noryang Point

The Battle of Noryang Point was the final naval battle in the war. The Korean navy under Admiral Yi had recovered from its losses and was aided by the Chinese navy under Chen Lin. Intelligence reports revealed that 500 Japanese ships were anchored in the narrow straits of Noryang in order to withdraw the remaining Japanese troops. Noting the narrow geography of the area, Admiral Yi and Chen Lin led a surprise attack against the Japanese fleet at 2:00 am on December 16, 1598, using cannons and fire arrows.

By dawn, nearly half of the Japanese battle ships were destroyed; as the Japanese began to withdraw, Admiral Yi ordered the final charge to destroy the remaining few ships. As Yi's flagship sped forward, he was shot on the left side of his chest under the arm. Only 3 nearby captains, including his cousin, saw his death. Yi told his captains to keep his death secret and to continue the battle so that the morale of the soldiers would not drop. Admiral Yi died in minutes.

The battle ended as an allied victory and a Japanese loss of nearly 250 battleships out of the original 500. Only after the battle did the soldiers learn of Yi's death, and it is said that Chen Lin lamented that Yi died in his stead.

There are marked similarities between the Battle of Noryang Point and the Battle of Salamis, which was fought between the Greeks and the Persians in 480 BC, on the tactical, strategic and even operational levels.

Postwar negotiations

As Tsushima suffered greatly from its loss of trade with Korea as a result of the invasions, Yoshitoshi of the Sō family then dominant in Tsushima sent four peace negotiation missions to Korea since 1599: the first three were captured and sent to Beijing by the Chinese troops, and the fourth one in 1601 successfully obtained from Seoul the condition of returning the Korean captives for peace. However, the major incentive for Korea toward normalization of relations with Japan was the withdrawal of the Chinese soldiers, which could result from the normalization, since the Chinese themselves were causing havoc as much as the Japanese had. Yoshitoshi then released several Korean prisoners, and, between the years 1603 and 1604, helped the two Korean envoys in repatriating of a further 3,000 by organizing a negotiation at Kyoto with Tokugawa Ieyasu, then the Shogun of Japan.

In continuation of the diplomatic talks toward peaceful relations, Korea in 1606 demanded that the Shogun write a formal letter wishing for peace, and that the Japanese soldiers who had defiled the royal tombs in Seoul be extradited. Unable to fulfill the request, Yoshitoshi sent a forged letter and a group of criminals instead; despite the apparent fraud, the great need to dispel the Chinese soldiers appropriately pushed the Koreans to send an embassy in 1608. The end result of the visit was a return of hundreds of Koreans as well as the restoration of the diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Aftermath and Conclusion

Yeosu today. Admiral Yi's headquarter was stationed here.

The two Japanese invasions were the Asia's first world war that involved massive armies equipped with modern weapons. The regular deployment of Japanese armies sizing up to 200,000, Chinese armies in the 80,000 at the most, and the regular and irregular Korean participation in the hundreds of thousands find no equivalent European counterpart of that period.

The invasions also stood as a challenge to the existing Chinese world order on two levels: the military, in which the war reaffirmed Ming's status as the supreme military power in East Asia, and the political, in which the war promised Chinese benevolence for the protection of its tributary states.

If the theory that Hideyoshi attempted to conquer China (as opposed to the thesis that Hideyoshi dealt with the goal of the "Japanocentric world order" in more realistic yet theoretical terms) holds true, it is important to note that the geopolitical position of Korea as the bridge between China and Japan caused the war to happen completely on the Korean peninsula (the same holds true for the Sino-Japanese War, and the Mongol invasions of Japan in reverse).

Losses and gains

All three participant countries - Japan, China, and Korea, took very heavy losses from the war. Japan achieved zero material gain at the cost of thousands of lives and large sum of national wealth. When Toyotomi Hideyori, only five years old, was made the heir to the Hideyoshi’s throne, internal power struggles arose and led to the proclamation of Tokugawa Ieyasu as the Shogun in 1603. China had to bear the financial burden from defending Korea, all the while fighting a new war with the Manchus (which would culminate in the rise of the Qing Dynasty). As for Korea, which withstood the most damage out of the three, this conflict was more devastating than any other event in its history (even the Korean War). Reduction of arable land to sixty-six percent of the prewar farming greatly hurt Korea's mainly agricultural economy; famine, disease, and rebellions ran rampant in Korea. Significant losses of historical archives, cultural and scientific artifacts (such as the water clock Ja-gyuk-roo), and skilled artisans marked the nadir of Korean science in its decline.

The total military and civilian casualty as estimated by a late 19th century historian, Geo H. Jones, is 1 million, and the total combat casualty ranges around 250,000. A total of 185,738 Korean and 29,014 Chinese prize heads, and 50 to 60,000 captives were taken by the Japanese throughout the war. Among those captured, a total of 7,500 were returned to Korea through diplomatic means. A large portion of the captives were sold to European traders — mainly Portuguese, who then resold them to Southeast Asia.

The captives brought, including scholars, craftsmen, medicine makers, and gold smelters, provided to Japan many cultural and technological gains. Japanese typography began with Korean fonts and technicians along with the adoption of the Western techniques. The first production of porcelain (Arita) in Japan began in 1616 at the town of Imari when a Korean potter called Yi Sam-pyong discovered kaolin-rich clay. As Korean pottery was highly prized in Japan, many Japanese lords established pottery-producing kilns with the captured Korean potters in Kyūshū and other parts of Japan, and these communities were forced to maintain their Korean traditions and to keep away from the rest of the society.

Cruelty and war crimes

Participants from the all three countries committed some form of crime during the war. Some Korean bandits and highwaymen took advantage of the chaos during the war to form raiding bands and rob other Koreans. The inhabitants of the Hamgyong Province (in the northernmost parts of the Korean peninsula) surrendered their fortresses, and turned in their generals and governor officials to the Japanese invaders (because they felt that their Joseon government had oppressed them). Many Koreans generals and government officials deserted their posts whenever danger seemed imminent. The Chinese were said to be no better than the Japanese in the amount of destructions they caused and the degree of the crimes they committed. They even attacked Korean forces, and could not distinguish between the Korean civilians and the Japanese. Military competition that the Chinese generals felt with the Koreans resulted, by the end of the war, in the indiscriminate killing of the Korean civilians in Namhae, whom the Chinese General Chen Lin labeled as Japanese collaborators in order to gain more head counts.

According to Stephen Turnbull, a historian specializing in the Japanese samurais, the Japanese troops committed the worst crimes against civilians in battles, and killed indiscriminately, including farm animals. Outside of the main battles, Japanese raided Korean habitations to “kill, rape and steal in a more cruel manner than…” Japanese soldiers treated their own peasants no better than the captured Koreans, and worked them all to death by starvation and flogging. The Japanese collected enough ears and noses (cutting ears off of enemy bodies for making casualty counts was an accepted practice) to build a large mound near the Hideyoshi’s Great Buddha, called the Mimizuka, or “the Mound of Ears”.

Legacy

The war embedded mythical and nationalistic elements into the three countries. The Koreans gained several national heroes, including Admiral Yi, whose ancestral home was made a shrine. Admiral Yi was and still is a subject of reverence in both China and Japan: for example, Admiral Togo, famed for his success at the Battle of Tsushima during the Russo-Japanese War, called Admiral Yi the greatest naval commander in history. In appreciation of the Chinese aid, the Koreans built a sacrificial alter for the Chinese Emperor Wanli, and held rituals for the emperor well into the 1990 s. In the Chinese academia, the historians made the war as one of Wanli Emperor's "Three Great Punitive Campaigns". As for Japan, the contemporary leaders justified the war with a previous incursion to Korea led by Empress Jingu in 400 AD, claiming that they were being blessed by the god of war, Hachiman, whom Empress Jingu carried in her womb during her invasion. This temporary and partial occupation of Korea fixed a Japanese argument that Korea had always been part of Japan, and the Japanese leaders of the late 19th and the early 20th centuries used the war to justify the their occupation of Korea. Hideyoshi's former castle at Osaka was restored as a museum in the 1930 s to commemorate Japan's military history. In the context of Japanese imperialism, the invasions are seen as the first Japanese attempt to become a global power. In China (as well as Korea), the war inspired nationalistic resistance against the Japanese imperialism during the 20th century.

International awareness

Despite the great enthusiasm for the war in East Asia, the Japanese invasions of Korea are not widely known in the west. Historian Stephen Turnbull attributes to this ignorance titles such as the Hideyoshi's Invasions of Korea (merely an extended part of Toyotomi Hideyoshi's biography) and the Japanese invasions of Korea (simply a larger repeat of the Japanese wako pirate raids) absent the distinction as a "war". Some textbooks treat the war with a few lines, and to date not a single complete academic study on the subject exists in English. Historian Kenneth M. Swope lists a near exception: Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War 1592–98 by Stephen Turnbull, but criticizes the work for undercoverage on the Chinese perspective, and for its pro-Japanese bias.

Footnotes

• Note: All websites are listed here independently from the References section.

References

• Alagappa, Muthiah. "Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features", Stanford University Press, 2003. ISBN 080474629X

• Arano, Yasunori. "The Formation of a Japanocentric World Order." International Journal of Asian Studies 2:2 (2005).

• Brown, Delmer M. "The Impact of Firearms on Japanese Warfare, 1543-1598", The Far Eastern Quarterly May 1948 (Volume 7, Number 3: pp. 236-253), Association for Asian Studies.

• Eikenberry, Karl W. "The Imjin War." Military Review 68:2 (February 1988), pp. 74–82.

• Ha, Tae-hung, tr., and Sohn Pow-key, ed. Nanjung Ilgi: War Diary of Admiral Yi Sun-sin. Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1977, ISBN 89-7141-018-3.

• Hawley, Samuel, The Imjin War, The Royal Asiatic Society, Korea Branch/UC Berkeley Press, 2005, ISBN 89-954424-2-5.

• Jang, Pyun-soon. Noon-eu-ro Bo-nen Han-gook-yauk-sa 5: Gor-yeo Si-dae (눈으로 보는 한국역사 5: 고려시대), Park Doo-ui, Bae Keum-ram, Yi Sang-mi, Kim Ho-hyun, Kim Pyung-sook, et al., Joog-ang Gyo-yook-yaun-goo-won. 1998-10-30. Seoul, Korea.

• Jones, Geo H. "The Japanese Invasion of Korea - 1592", The China Review, or notes & queries on the Far East, 1899 (Volume 23, Number 4-5: pp. 215-219, pp. 239-254), China Mail Office.

• Kim, Ki-chung. "Resistance, Abduction, and Survival: The Documentary Literature of the Imjin War (1592–8)." Korean Culture 20:3 (Fall 1999), pp. 20–29.

• Kim, Yung-sik. "Problems and Possibilities in the Study of the History of Korean Science". Osiris, 2nd Series, Vol. 13, Beyond Joseph Needham: Science, Technology, and Medicine in East and Southeast Asia. (1998), pp. 48-79. JSTOR

• 桑田忠親 [Kuwata, Tadachika], ed., 舊參謀本部編纂, [Kyu Sanbo Honbu], 朝鮮の役 [Chousen no Eki]　(日本の戰史 [Nihon no Senshi] Vol. 5), 1965.

• Neves, Jaime Ramalhete. "The Portuguese in the Im-Jim War?" Review of Culture 18 (1994), pp. 20–24.

• Niderost, Eric. “Turtleboat Destiny: The Imjin War and Yi Sun Shin.” Military Heritage 2:6 (June 2001), pp. 50–59, 89.

• Niderost, Eric. "The Miracle at Myongnyang, 1597." Osprey Military Journal 4:1 (January 2002), pp. 44–50.

• Park, Yune-hee. Admiral Yi Sun-shin and His Turtleboat Armada: A Comprehensive Account of the Resistance of Korea to the 16th Century Japanese Invasion. Seoul: Shinsaeng Press, 1973.

• Rockstein, Edward D., Ph.D. Strategic And Operational Aspects of Japan's Invasions of Korea 1592-1598, 1993-6-18. Naval War College, Newport, R.I.

• Sadler, A.L. "The Naval Campaign in the Korean War of Hideyoshi (1592–1598)." Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan Second Series, 14 (June 1937), pp. 179–208.

• Sansom, George. A History of Japan 1334-1615, Stanford University Press. (1961) ISBN 0-8047-0525-9

• Sohn, Pow-key. "Early Korean Painting", Journal of American Oriental Society, Vol. 79, No. 2. (April - June, 1959), pp. 96-103. JSTOR.

• Stramigioli, Giuliana. "Hideyoshi's Expansionist Policy on the Asiatic Mainland." Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan Third Series, 3 (December 1954), pp. 74–116.

• Strauss, Barry. "Korea's Legendary General", MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History Summer 2005 (Volume 17, Number 4: pp. 52-61).

• Swope, Kenneth M. "Beyond Turtleboats: Siege Accounts from Hideyoshi's Second Invasion of Korea, 1597-1598", Sungkyun Journal of East Asian Studies (Vol. 6, No. 2. 2006 Academy of East Asian Studies. pp. 177-206)

• Swope, Kenneth M. "Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed During the Sino-Japanese-Korean War, 1592-1598", The Journal of Military History pp. 69 (January 2005): pp. 11-42. (C) Society for Military History.

• Swope, Kenneth M. "Deceit, Disguise, and Dependence: China, Japan, and the Future of the Tributary System, 1592-1596". The International History Review, XXIV. 4: December 2002, pp. 757-1,008.

• Turnbull, Stephen. Samurai Invasion: Japan’s Korean War 1592–98. London: Cassell & Co, 2002, ISBN 0-304-35948-3.

• Turnbull, Stephen. 'The Samurai Sourcebook'. London: Cassell & Co. 1998.

• Villiers, John. "SILK AND SILVER: MACAU, MANILA AND TRADE IN THE CHINA SEAS IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY" (A lecture delivered to the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society at the Hong Kong Club. 10 June 1980). The HKUL Digital Initiatives

• Yi, Min-Woong [이민웅], Imjin Wae-ran Haejeonsa: The Naval Battles of the Imjin War [임진왜란 해전사], Chongoram Media [청어람미디어], 2004, ISBN 89-89722-49-7.

See also

• Timeline of the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592-1598) — incomplete
• List of battles during the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592-1598)
• List of naval battles during the Japanese invasions of Korea (1592-1598)
• Naval history of Korea
• Immortal Yi Soon-shin (TV series)

External links

• Toyotomi Hideyoshi's Korean Invasions: the Bunroku Campaign (1592–93)
• 임진왜란 (very visual website)
• The Battles of Imjin Waeran (in Korean)
• The Imjin Waeran (in Korean)
• Jinju National Museum is dedicated to this topic. Information in English and Korean.
• The Imjinwaeran (in English)