Michael Polanyi

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Michael Polanyi (born Polányi Mihály) (March 11, 1891 – February 22, 1976) was a Hungarian–British polymath who made original contributions to physical chemistry, economics, and philosophy. He was both a Fellow of the Royal Society and a Fellow of Merton College, Oxford.

Early life

Michael was born into a secular Jewish family in Budapest. His older brother Karl became a famous economist. Their father was an engineer and railway entrepreneur whose bankrupcy motivated Polanyi to seek financial stability through a career in medicine. He graduated in 1913, and served in the Austro-Hungarian army during World War I, but was hospitalised, and during his convalescence wrote what became a doctorate in physical chemistry from the University of Budapest (with Gusztáv Buchböck) in 1917.

In 1920, he emigrated to Germany and ended up working as a research chemist, and in 1926 a professor, at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Fiber Chemistry in Berlin. There, he married Magda Elizabeth in a Roman Catholic ceremony. In 1929, Magda gave birth to a son John, who went on to win a Nobel Prize in chemistry. With the coming to power in 1933 of the Nazi party Polanyi took up a position as Professor of Physical Chemistry at the University of Manchester in England. As a consequence of a shift in his interests from chemistry to economics and philosophy Manchester created a chair in Social Science (1948-58) for him.

Physical chemistry

Polanyi's scientific interests were diverse, embracing chemical kinetics, x-ray diffraction and the absorption of gases at solid surfaces.

In 1934, Polanyi, at the same time as G. I. Taylor and Egon Orowan realised that the plastic deformation of ductile materials could be explained in terms of the theory of dislocations developed by Vito Volterra in 1905. The insight was critical in developing the modern science of solid mechanics.

Philosophy of science

From the mid-1930s, Polanyi began to articulate his opposition to the prevailing positivist account of science, arguing that it failed to recognise the the role which commitments and tacit knowing play in science.

Polanyi argued that positivism encouraged the notion that scientific research ought to be directed by the State. Polanyi, like his friend Friedrich Hayek, drew attention to the part which spontaneous order plays in the formation of social orders, but unlike Hayek he emphasised the part which commitments play in the formation and maintenance of dedicated communities.

Polanyi endorsed the pursuit of objective truth (Personal Knowledge, p. 16), but rejected the assumption that truth is a mechanical product of method, because all methods ultimately rely upon commitments made by interpretors, who draw upon their tacit awareness. This awareness is not infallible, but nor is it reducible to cultural practices; our tacit awareness can connect us with realities.

Polanyi argued that all knowing is personal. Our skills and passions play a necessary part in knowing. Our comprehension of our experience is influenced by our assumptions, but it does not follow that knowledge claims have no objective validity. They may be subjective, but only when they are false.

Polanyi acknowledged the importance of inherited practices (tradition). The fact that we know more than we can articulate contributes to the conclusion that much knowledge is passed on by non-explicit means, such as apprenticeship - observing a master, and then practicing under the master's guidance).

Polanyi's philosophical ideas are most fully expressed in the Gifford lectures he gave in 1951–52 at the University of Aberdeen which resulted in the book Personal Knowledge. His philosophical ideas influenced, amongst others, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerbend and Imre Lakatos.

Economics

His 1951 book, The Logic of Liberty, is a collection of essays which link the practice of science with the practices which sustain a free society. He elaborated on the connections in a 1962 article, "The Republic of Science: Its Political and Economic Theory" in Minerva.[1][2]

Polanyi argued that scientists respond to each other in ways that are similar to the way in which individuals coordinate with each other in the free market. The spontaneous order that results however also operates within the constraints supplied by the commitments which generate and sustain the scientific community.

He believed that free societies facilitate advancement. Both his belief that science relies upon commitments, and his claim that these commitments operate within the context of a plurality of dedicated communities, lead to this conclusion. Scientists, like entrepreneurs, require freedom to pursue their ends. In The Republic of Science, Polanyi emphasises the importance of allowing scientists the freedom to pursue truth as an end in itself i.e. independent of any practical objectives:

"...[S]cientists, freely making their own choice of problems and pursuing them in the light of their own personal judgment, are in fact cooperating as members of a closely knit organization. ...

"Such self-co-ordination of independent initiatives leads to a joint result which is unpremeditated by any of those who bring it about. Their co-ordination is guided as by an "invisible hand" towards the joint discovery of a hidden system of things. Since its end-result is unknown, this kind of co-operation can only advance stepwise, and the total performance will be the best possible if each consecutive step is decided upon by the person most competent to do so. ...

"Any attempt to organize the group ... under a single authority would eliminate their independent initiatives and thus reduce their joint effectiveness to that of the single person directing them from the centre. It would, in effect, paralyse their cooperation."

He therefore opposed government planning of scientific inquiry, on the grounds that central planning is inferior to inquirers operating freely within the constraints supplied by the values and practices of the scientific community.

His Family

Michael Polanyi's son, John Charles Polanyi, is a Professor of Chemistry at the University of Toronto, Canada. In 1986 he was awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry.[3]

See also

References

  1. ↑ in Minerva Volume 1: 1962 pp54-74.
  2. ↑ The article can also be viewed here.
  3. ↑ http://www.utoronto.ca/jpolanyi

Bibliography

Further reading

  • Richard Gelwick, The Way of Discovery, An Introduction to the Thought of Michael Polanyi. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock, 2004, 181, pp. ISBN 1-59244-687-6 (English).
  • Drusilla Scott, Everyman Revived: The Common Sense of Michael Polanyi. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995, 216 pp. ISBN 0-8028-4079-5.
  • William Taussig Scott and Martin X. Moleski, Michael Polanyi, Scientist and Philosopher. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2005, 364 pp. ISBN-13-978-0-19-517433-5, ISBN 0-19-517433-X

External links

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