Elinor Ostrom/Bibliography
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References are sorted by date; most recent first. This bibliography is preliminary and still requires some cleanup.
Poteete, AR, and E Ostrom. “Fifteen Years of Empirical Research on Collective Action in Natural Resource Management:.” World Development (2008):
Hess, C, E Ostrom, and GM McCombs. Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice. MIT Press, 2007.
Janssen, MA, JM Anderies, E Ostrom, and IN Bloomington. “Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems to Spatial and Temporal Variability.” Society and Natural Resources 20, (2007): 307-322.
Redman, SH Schneider, E Ostrom, AN Pell, and J. “Coupled Human and Natural Systems.” AMBIO: A Journal of the Human Environment (2007):
Liu, J, T Dietz, SR Carpenter, M Alberti, C Folke, E Moran, AN Pell, P Deadman, T Kratz, and J Lubchenco. “Complexity of Coupled Human and Natural Systems.” Science 317, no. 5844 (2007): 1513.
Ostrom, E. “Self-Governance and Forest Resources.” Terracotta reader: a market approach to the environment (2007): 131.
Ostrom, E. “A Diagnostic Approach for Going Beyond Panaceas.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 39 (2007): 15181.
Young, OR, F Berkhout, GC Gallopin, MA Janssen, E Ostrom, and S van der Leeuw. “The Globalization of Socio-Ecological Systems: An Agenda for Scientific Research.” Global Environmental Change 16, no. 3 (2006): 304-316.
Janssen, MA, and E Ostrom. “Empirically Based, Agent-Based Models.” Ecology and Society 11, no. 2 (2006): 37.
Janssen, MA, and E Ostrom. “Governing Social-Ecological Systems.” Handbook of Computational Economics II: Agent-Based Computational Economics (2006): 1465-1509.
Janssen, MA, and E Ostrom. “Resilience, Vulnerability, and Adaptation: A Cross-Cutting Theme of the International.” Global Environmental Change (2006):
Janssen, MA, and E Ostrom. “Adoption of a New Regulation for the Governance of Common-Pool Resources By a.” Inequality (2006):
Khasnobis, R Kanbur, E Ostrom, K Hart, and RK. “Linking the Formal and Informal Economy.” Oxford, England: Oxford University Press (2006):
Ostrom, E. “The Value-Added of Laboratory Experiments for the Study of Institutions and Common-Pool Resources.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 61, no. 2 (2006): 149-163.
Agrawal, A, and E Ostrom. “Political Science and Conservation Biology: A Dialog of the Deaf.” Conservation Biology (2006):
Ostrom, E, and H Nagendra. “Insights on Linking Forests, Trees, and People From the Air, on the Ground, and in the Laboratory.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103, no. 51 (2006): 19224.
Gibson, CC, JT Williams, and E Ostrom. “Local Enforcement and Better Forests.” World Development 33, no. 2 (2005): 273-284.
Ostrom, E. Understanding Institutional Diversity. Princeton Univ Pr, 2005.
Hayes, T, and E Ostrom. “The Law and Economics of Development and Environment: Conserving the World's Forests: Are Rotected Areas the Only Way?” Ind. L. Rev. 38, (2005): 595-1379.
Ostrom, E, and J Walker. Trust and Reciprocity: Interdisciplinary Lessons for Experimental Research. Russell Sage Foundation Publications, 2005.
Gibson, CC, K Andersson, and E Ostrom. The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid. Oxford University Press, USA, 2005.
Ostrom, E. “Doing Institutional Analysis: Digging Deeper Than Markets and Hierarchies.” Handbook of new institutional economics (2005): 819-848.
Ostrom, E. “Policies That Crowd Out Reciprocity and Collective Action.” Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The. (2005):
Moran, EF, and E Ostrom. Seeing the Forest and the Trees: Human-Environment Interactions in Forest Ecosystems. Mit Press, 2005.
Anderies, JM, MA Janssen, and E Ostrom. “A Framework to Analyze the Robustness of Social-Ecological Systems From an Institutional Perspective.” Ecology and Society 9, no. 1 (2004): 18.
Poteete, AR, and E Ostrom. “Heterogeneity, Group Size and Collective Action: The Role of Institutions in Forest Management.” Development and Change 35, no. 3 (2004): 435-461.
Ostrom, E, and V Ostrom. “The Quest for Meaning in Public Choice.” The Production and Diffusion of Public Choice. (2004):
Poteete, AR, and E Ostrom. “In Pursuit of Comparable Concepts and Data About Collective Action.” Agricultural Systems 82, no. 3 (2004): 215-232.
Cardenas, JC, TK Ahn, and E Ostrom. Communication and Co-Operation in a Common-Pool Resource Dilemma: Field Experiments (2004).
Cardenas, JC, and E Ostrom. “What Do People Bring Into the Game? Experiments in the Field About Cooperation in the Commons.” Agricultural Systems 82, no. 3 (2004): 307-326.
Ostrom, E. “Toward a Behavioral Theory Linking Trust, Reciprocity, and Reputation.” Trust and reciprocity: Interdisciplinary lessons from experimental research (2003): 19ñ79.
Dietz, T, E Ostrom, and PC Stern. “The Struggle to Govern the Commons.” Science 302, no. 5652 (2003): 1907.
Dolsak, N, and E Ostrom. “The Challenges of the Commons.” The Commons in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptation, MIT Press, London (2003): 3-34.
Dolsak, N, and E Ostrom. “The Commons in the New Millennium.” MIT Pr. (2003).
Dongier, P, J Van Domelen, E Ostrom, A Ryan, W Wakeman, A Bebbington, S Alkire, T Esmail, and M Polski. “Community Driven Development.” Poverty Reduction Strategy (2003):
Ostrom, E. “How Types of Goods and Property Rights Jointly Affect Collective Action.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 15, no. 3 (2003): 239.
Schmidt, D, R Shupp, JM Walker, and E Ostrom. “Playing Safe in Coordination Games: The Roles of Risk Dominance, Payoff Dominance, and History of Play.” Games and Economic Behavior 42, no. 2 (2003): 281-299.
Ostrom, E, and J Walker. Trust and Reciprocity. Russell Sage Foundation, 2003.
Hess, C, and E Ostrom. “Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource.” Law and Contemporary Problems (2003): 111-146.
Low, B, E Ostrom, C Simon, and J Wilson. “Redundancy and Diversity: Do They Influence Optimal Management?” Navigating Social-Ecological Systems: Building Resilience for Complexity and Change (2003): 83-114.
Ostrom, E, and TK Ahn. Foundations of Social Capital. Edward Elgar Pub, 2003.
Ostrom, E, and TK Ahn. “A Social Science Perspective on Social Capital: Social Capital and Collective Action.” REVISTA MEXICANA DE SOCIOLOGIA 65, no. 1 (2003): 155-233.
Ahn, TK, E Ostrom, and J Walker. “Incorporating Motivational Heterogeneity Into Game Theoretic Models of Collective Action.” Public Choice (2003):
Ahn, TK, E Ostrom, and JM Walker. “Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action.” Public Choice 117, no. 3 (2003): 295-314.
Anderies, JM, MA Janssen, and E Ostrom. “Design Principles for Robustness of Institutions in Social-Ecological Systems.” Joining the Northern Commons: Lessons for the World (2003):
Dietz, T, N Dolsak, E Ostrom, and PC Stern. “The Drama of the Commons.” The drama of the commons (2002): 3-35.
Shivakoti, GP, and E Ostrom. Improving Irrigation Governance and Management in Nepal. ICS Press, 2002.
Stern, PC, T Dietz, N Dolsak, E Ostrom, and S Stonich. “Knowledge and Questions After 15 Years of Research.” The Drama of the Commons: Committee on the human dimensions of global change (2002): 445.
Ostrom, EE, TE Dietz, NE Dolsak, PC Stern, and SE Stonich. “The Drama of the Commons.” (2002):
Futtema, C, F Castro, MC Silva-Forsberg, and E Ostrom. “The Emergence and Outcomes of Collective Action: An Institutional and Ecosystem Approach.” Ambiente & sociedade (2002): 107-127.
Ahn, TK, E Ostrom, D Schmidt, and J Walker. “Trust in Two-Person Games: Game Structures and Linkages.” This volume (2002):
Ostrom, E. “Reformulating the Commons.” Ambiente & sociedade (2002): 5-25.
Ostrom, E. “Property-Rights Regimes and Common Goods: A Complex Link.” Common Goods: Reinventing European and. (2002):
Poteete, A, and E Ostrom. “An Institutional Approach to the Study of Forest Resources.” Human Impacts on Tropical Forest Biodiversity and Genetic Resources (2002):
Ostrom, E, C Gibson, S Shivakumar, and K Andersson. “Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability.” Studies in Evaluation (2002):
Kopelman, S, JM Weber, DM Messick, EE Ostrom, TE Dietz, NE Dolsak, PC Stern, and SE Stonich. “Factors Influencing Cooperation in a Commons Dilemmas: A Review of Experimental Psychological Research.” The Drama of the Commons: Committee on the human dimensions of global change (2002): 113.
Ostrom, E. “Decentralization and Development: The New Panacea.” Challenges to democracy: Ideas, involvement and institutions (2001): 237ñ56.
Ostrom, E. “The Puzzle of Counterproductive Property Rights Reforms: A Conceptual Analysis.” Access to land, rural poverty, and public action (2001): 129-150.
Ostrom, E. “Vulnerability and Polycentric Governance Systems.” UpdateñNewsletter of the International Human Dimensions Programme on Global Environmental Change 3, (2001):
Shupp, R, J Walker, TK Ahn, and E Ostrom. “Dilemma Games: Game Parameters and Matching Protocols.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2001):
Varughese, G, and E Ostrom. “The Contested Role of Heterogeneity in Collective Action: Some Evidence From Community Forestry in Nepal.” World development 29, no. 5 (2001): 747-765.
Hess, C, and E Ostrom. “Artifacts, Facilities, and Content: Information as a Common-Pool Resource.” Conference on the Public Domain (2001):
Agrawal, A, and E Ostrom. “Collective Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in Resource Use in India and Nepal.” Politics and Society 29, no. 4 (2001): 485-514.
Ahn, TK, and E Ostrom. “Social Capital and the Second-Generation Theories of Collective Action: An Analytical Approach.” Annual Meeting of the American Political Science. (2001):
Ahn, TK, E Ostrom, D Schmidt, R Shupp, and J Walker. “Cooperation in Pd Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play.” Public Choice 106, no. 1 (2001): 137-155.
Ostrom, E, C Gibson, S Shivakumar, and K Andersson. Aid, Incentives, and Sustainability: An Institutional Analysis of Development Cooperation. Sida, 2001.
Burger, J, E Ostrom, and RB Norgaard. Protecting the Commons: A Framework for Resource Management in the Americas. Island Pr, 2001.
Costanza, R, BS Low, E Ostrom, and JA Wilson. “Ecosystems and Human Systems: A Framework for Exploring the Linkages.” Eds R Costanza (2001):
Crawford, S, and E Ostrom. “A Grammar of Institutions.” Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (2000): 114.
Ostrom, E. “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14, no. 3 (2000): 137-158.
Ostrom, E. “Social Capital: A Fad Or a Fundamental Concept.” Social capital: A multifaceted perspective (2000): 172-214.
Ostrom, E. “Crowding Out Citizenship.” Scandinavian Political Studies 23, no. 1 (2000): 3-16.
Ostrom, E. “The Danger of Self-Evident Truths.” PS: Political Science and Politics 33, no. 1 (2000): 33-44.
Ostrom, E. “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action.” Polycentric games and institutions: readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (2000): 472.
Ostrom, E, and J Walker. “Neither Markets Nor States: Linking Transformation Processes in Collective Action Arenas.” Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (2000): 427.
Walker, JM, R Gardner, A Herr, and E Ostrom. “Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes.” The Economic Journal 110, no. 460 (2000): 212-234.
Weissing, FJ, and E Ostrom. “Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement on Government-and Farmer-Managed Systems.” Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (2000): 366.
Ostrom, E, and MB Wertime. “International Forestry Resources and Institutions Research Strategy.” People and forests: Communities, institutions, and governance (2000): 243-268.
Ostrom, E, and MB Wertime. “IFRI Research Strategy.” People and forests: Communities (2000):
Gardner, R, A Herr, E Ostrom, and JA Walker. “The Power and Limitations of Proportional Cutbacks in Common-Pool Resources.” Journal of Development Economics 62, no. 2 (2000): 515-534.
Gibson, CC, MA McKean, and E Ostrom. People and Forests: Communities, Institutions, and Governance. The MIT Press, 2000.
Gibson, CC, MA McKean, and E Ostrom. “Explaining Deforestation: The Role of Local Institutions.” People and forests: Communities, institutions, and governance (2000): 1-26.
Gibson, CC, MA McKean, and E Ostrom. “People and Forests.” MIT Press (2000):
Kiser, LL, and E Ostrom. “The Three Worlds of Action: A Metatheoretical Synthesis of Institutional Approaches.” Polycentric Games and Institutions: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (2000): 56.
Gibson, CC, E Ostrom, and TK Ahn. “The Concept of Scale and the Human Dimensions of Global Change: A Survey.” Ecological Economics 32, no. 2 (2000): 217-239.
Gibson, CC, E Ostrom, and MA McKean. “Forests, People, and Governance: Some Initial Theoretical Lessons.” People and Forests: Communities, Institutions and Governance,(C. Gibson, E. Ostrom, and MA McKean, eds.). MIT Press, Cambridge, USA (2000): 227-242.
Ostrom, E. “Coping With Tragedies of the Commons.” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 493-535.
Ostrom, E. “Metropolitan Reform: Propositions Derived From Two Traditions.” Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (1999): 139.
Ostrom, E. “Design Principles in Long-Enduring Irrigation Institutions.” Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (1999): 74.
Ostrom, E. “Institutional Rational Choice.” Theories of the policy process (1999): 35ñ72.
Ostrom, E. “Coping With the Tragedy of the Commons.” Annual Review of Political Science (1999):
Ostrom, E. “Die Verfassung Der Allmende.” Mohr Siebeck (1999):
Elinor, O. “Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.” (1999):
Ostrom, V, and E Ostrom. “Public Goods and Public Choices.” Polycentricity and Local Public Economies. Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (1999): 75-105.
Parks, RB, PC Baker, LL Kiser, RJ Oakerson, E Ostrom, V Ostrom, GP Whitaker, and R Wilson. “Consumers as Coproducers of Public Services: Some Economic and Institutional Considerations.” Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (1999): 381.
Parks, RB, and E Ostrom. “Complex Models of Urban Service Systems.” Polycentricity and Local Public Economies: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (1999): 355-380.
Ruttan, LM, M Borgerhoff Mulder, F Berkes, J Colding, C Folke, E Fratkin, JG Galaty, K Homewood, PD Little, and E Ostrom. “Are East African Pastoralists Truly Conservationists? 1.” Current Anthropology 40, no. 5 (1999): 621-652.
Schlager, E, and E Ostrom. “Property Rights Regimes and Coastal Fisheries: An Empirical Analysis.” Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (1999):
Hayashi, N, E Ostrom, J Walker, and T Yamagishi. “Reciprocity, Trust, and the Sense of Control: A Cross-Societal Study.” Rationality and Society 11, no. 1 (1999): 27.
Wilson, J, B Low, R Costanza, and E Ostrom. “Scale Misperceptions and the Spatial Dynamics of a Socialñecological System.” Ecological Economics 31, no. 2 (1999): 243-257.
Low, B, R Costanza, E Ostrom, J Wilson, and CP Simon. “Humanñecosystem Interactions: A Dynamic Integrated Model.” Ecological Economics 31, no. 2 (1999): 227-242.
McGinnis, MD. “Polycentric Governance and Development: Readings From the Workshop in Political Theory.” books.google.com (1999):
Agrawal, A, and E Ostrom. “Collective Action, Property Rights, and Devolution of Forest and Protected Area Management.” Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. Presented at the CAPRi workshop on ìDevolution, Property Rights, and Collective Actionî Puerto Azul, the Philippines, June (1999): 21-25.
Ostrom, E, J Burger, CB Field, RB Norgaard, and D Policansky. “Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges.” Science 284, no. 5412 (1999): 278.
Blomquist, W, and E Ostrom. “Institutional Capacity and the Resolution of a Commons Dilemma.” Polycentric governance and development: readings from the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis (1999): 60.
Ostrom, E, and P Sabatier. “Theories of the Policy Process.” (1999):
Gibson, C, E Ostrom, and TK Ahn. “Scaling Issues in the Social Sciences.” International Human Dimensions Program, Working Paper 1, (1998):
Ostrom, E. “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action: Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997.” American Political Science Review (1998): 1-22.
Ostrom, E. “The Institutional Analysis and Development Approach.” Designing institutions for environmental and resource management (1998): 68-90.
Ostrom, E. “Scales, Polycentricity, and Incentives: Designing Complexity to Govern Complexity.” Protection of global biodiversity: Converging strategies (1998): 149-167.
Ostrom, E. “The Comparative Study of Public Economies.” American Economist 42, no. 1 (1998):
Ostrom, E. “The International Forestry Resources and Institutions Research Program: A Methodology for Relating Human Incentives and Actions on Forest Cover and Biodiversity.” Forest biodiversity in North, Central and South America, and the Caribbean: Research and monitoring (1998): 1-28.
Polski, MM, and E Ostrom. “An Institutional Framework for Policy Analysis and Design.” Bloomington (1998):
Lam, WF, M Lee, and E Ostrom. “The Institutional Analysis and Development Framework: Application to Irrigation Policy in.” Workshop on Political Theory and Policy Analysis (1997):
Ostrom, E. “7 Investing in Capital, Institutions, and Incentives.” Institutions and economic development: growth and governance in less-developed and post-socialist countries (1997): 153.
Ostrom, E. “Self-Governance of Common-Pool Resources.” (1997):
Ostrom, E. “Institutional Rational Choice: An Assessment of the Iad Framework.” (1996):
McGinnis, M, and E Ostrom. “Design Principles for Local and Global Commons.” The International political economy and International institutions 2, (1996): 465-493.
Ostrom, E. “Crossing the Great Divide: Coproduction, Synergy, and Development.” World Development 24, no. 6 (1996): 1073-1087.
Ostrom, E, and E Schlager. “The Formation of Property Rights.” Rights to nature: Ecological, economic, cultural, and political principles of institutions for the environment (1996): 127-156.
Keohane, RO, and E Ostrom. Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains. Sage Publications Ltd, 1995.
McKean, M, and E Ostrom. “Common Property Regimes in the Forest: Just a Relic From the Past.” Unasylva 46, no. 180 (1995): 3-15.
Ostrom, E. “Incentives, Rules of the Game, and Development.” Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics (1995):
Ostrom, E. “Designing Complexity to Govern Complexity.” Property rights and the environment: Social and ecological issues (1995): 33ñ45.
Ostrom, E. “New Horizons in Institutional Analysis.” American Political Science Review 89, no. 1 (1995): 174-178.
Ostrom, E. “Self-Organization and Social Capital.” Industrial and Corporate Change 4, no. 1 (1995): 131.
Ostrom, E. “6. Constituting Social Capital and Collective Action.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6, no. 4 (1994): 527.
Ostrom, E. “Neither Market Nor State: Governance of Common-Pool Resources in the Twenty-First Century.” (1994):
Ostrom, E, R Gardner, and J Walker. Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources. Univ of Michigan Pr, 1994.
Ostrom, E, R Gardner, and J Walker. “Games and Rules and Common Pool Resources.” Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1994):
Ostrom, E, R Gardner, J Walker, and G Rules. <a>A Href="Http://Www.Sscnet.Ucla.Edu/Ssc/Labs/Cameron/Nrs98/Nrpool.Htm">Common-Pool Resources</a>.” Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press (1994):
Ostrom, E, WF Lam, and M Lee. “The Performance of Self-Governing Irrigation Systems in Nepal.” Human Systems Management 13, (1994): 197-197.
Benjamin, P, WF Lam, E Ostrom, and G Shivakoti. “Institutions, Incentives, and Irrigation in Nepal.” Decentralization: Finance & Management Project Report. Burlington, VT: Associates in Rural Development (1994):
Blomquist, W, E Schlager, SY Tang, and E Ostrom. “Regularities From the Field and Possible Explanations.” Rules (1994).
Ostrom, E. “A Communitarian Approach to Local Governance.” National Civic Review 82, no. 3 (1993): 226-233.
Ostrom, E, and R Gardner. “Coping With Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 7, no. 4 (1993): 93-112.
Ostrom, E, L Schroeder, and S Wynne. Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development. Westview Press Boulder, 1993.
Ostrom, E, L Schroeder, and S Wynne. “Analyzing the Performance of Alternative Institutional Arrangements for Sustaining Rural.” Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory (1993):
Ostrom, E, LD Schroeder, and SG Wynne. Institutional Incentives and Sustainable Development: Infrastructure Policies in Perspective. Westview Pr, 1993.
Ostrom, E. “Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems.” San Francisco (1992):
Ostrom, E. “Community and the Endogenous Solution of Commons Problems.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 4, no. 3 (1992): 343.
Ostrom, E, J Walker, and R Gardner. “Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is Possible.” The American Political Science Review 86, no. 2 (1992): 404-417.
Schlager, E, and E Ostrom. “Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis.” Land economics 68, no. 3 (1992): 249-262.
Ostrom, E, and E Schlager. “Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis.” Land Economics (1992):
Schlager, E, and E Ostrom. “Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources.” Land economics 68, no. 3 (1992): 249-262.
Ostrom, E. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge Univ Pr, 1991.
Ostrom, E. Governing the Commons. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991.
Ostrom, E. “Rational Choice Theory and Institutional Analysis: Toward Complementarity.” The American Political Science Review (1991): 237-243.
Gardner, R, and E Ostrom. “Rules and Games.” Public Choice 70, no. 2 (1991): 121-149.
Ostrom, V, and E Ostrom. “Public Goods and Public Choices: The Emergence of Public Economies and Industry.” The meaning of American federalism: Constituting a. (1991):
Weissing, F, and E Ostrom. “Irrigation Institutions and the Games Irrigators Play: Rule Enforcement Without Guards.” (1991):
Weissing, F, and E Ostrom. “Crime and Punishment: Further Reflections on the Counterintuitive Results of Mixed.” Journal of Theoretical Politics (1991):
Ostrom, E, and E Ostrom. “Managing the Commons.” Chapter 1, (1990): 1-28.
Ostrom, E. “The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common Property Institutions.” (1990):
Ostrom, E. “Governingthecommons: Theevolutionofinstitutions for Collective Action.” Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (1990):
Gardner, R, E Ostrom, and JM Walker. “The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems.” Rationality and Society 2, no. 3 (1990): 335.
Walker, JM, R Gardner, and E Ostrom. “Rent Dissipation in a Limited-Access Common-Pool Resource: Experimental Evidence.” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 19, no. 3 (1990): 203-211.
Ostrom, E. “Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems.” Rationality and Society 1, no. 1 (1989): 11.
Ostrom, E, and JM Walker. “Communication in a Commons: Cooperation Without External Enforcement.” (1989):
Ostrom, V, RL Bish, and E Ostrom. Local Government in the United States. ICS Press San Francisco, 1988.
Ostrom, E. “An Agenda for the Study of Institutions.” Public Choice 48, no. 1 (1986): 3-25.
Ostrom, E. “Issues of Definition and Theory: Some Conclusions and Hypotheses.” Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management (1986): 599-615.
Ostrom, E. “How Inexorable is the Tragedy of the Commons'.” Institutional arrangements for changing the structure of. (1986):
Ostrom, E. “The Rudiments of a Revised Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Institutions.” Bloomington (1985):
Ostrom, E, and FX Kaufman. “A Method of Institutional Analysis.” Pathologies of Urban Processes (1985):
Ostrom, E. “The Social Stratification-Government Inequality Thesis Explored.” Urban Affairs Review 19, no. 1 (1983): 91.
Ostrom, E. “A Public Choice Approach to Metropolitan Institutions: Structure, Incentives, and Performance.” Social Science Journal (1983):
Ostrom, E. “Strategies of Political Inquiry.” Sage (1982):
Kiser, L, and E Ostrom. “The Three Worlds of Action.” Strategies of political inquiry (1982): 179-222.
Kiser, L, E Ostrom, and E Ostrom. “Strategies of Political Inquiry.” (1982):
Oakerson, R, E Ostrom, V Ostrom, S Percy, and M. “Coproduction of Public Services.” Analyzing urban service distributions (1982):
Whitaker, S Mastrofski, E Ostrom, R Parks, and S. “Basic Issues in Police Performance.” Washington (1982):
Ostrom, E, RB Parks, and GP Whitaker. Patterns of Metropolitan Policing. Ballinger Pub. Co., Cambridge, Mass, 1978.
Ostrom, E. “Collective Action and the Tragedy of the Commons.” Managing the Commons, San Francisco, WH Freeman (1977): 173-181.
Ostrom, E. “Policing Metropolitan America.” eric.ed.gov (1977):
Ostrom, V, and E Ostrom. “A Theory for Institutional Analysis of Common Pool Problems.” Managing the Commons (1977): 157-172.
McIver, JP, and E Ostrom. “Using Budget Pies to Reveal Preferences: Validation of a Survey Instrument.” Policy &# 38; Politics (1976):
Ostrom, E. “The Delivery of Urban Services: Outcomes of Change.” Sage Publications, Inc (1976):
Ostrom, E. “Size and Performance in a Federal System.” Publius (1976):
Ostrom, E, and GP Whitaker. “Community Control and Governmental Responsiveness: The Case of Police in Black.” Improving the quality of urban management (1974):
Ostrom, E, RB Parks, and GP Whitaker. “Defining and Measuring Structural Variations in Interorganizational Arrangements.” Publius (1974):
Ostrom, E. “Exclusion, Choice and Divisibility: Factors Affecting the Measurement of Urban Agency Output.” Social Science Quarterly (1974):
Smith, DC, and E Ostrom. “The Effects of Training and Education on Police Attitudes and Performance: A Preliminary.” The Potential for Reform of Criminal Justice (1974):
Ostrom, E, RB Parks, and GP Whitaker. “Do We Really Want to Consolidate Urban Police Forces? A Reappraisal of Some Old Assertions.” Public Administration Review (1973): 423-432.
Ostrom, E, and G Whitaker. “Does Local Community Control of Police Make a Difference? Some Preliminary Findings.” American Journal of Political Science 17, no. 1 (1973): 48-76.
Ostrom, E, WH Baugh, R Guarasci, RB Parks, and GP Whitaker. “Community Organization and the Provision of Police Services.” No.: SERIES 03-001 (1973): 95.
Ostrom, V, and E Ostrom. “Legal and Political Conditions of Water Resource Development.” Land Economics (1972):
Ostrom, V, and E Ostrom. “Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of Public Administration.” Public Administration Review 31, no. 2 (1971): 203-216.
Ostrom, V, and E Ostrom. “A Behavioral Approach to the Study of Intergovernmental Relations.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 359, no. 1 (1965): 137.
Ostrom, E. “Public Entrepreneurship: A Case Study in Ground-Water Basin Management.” unpublished PhD dissertation, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA (1964):
Ostrom, E, C Hess, and IN Bloomington. “Private and Common Property Rights.”
Ostrom, E, V Ostrom, D Feeny, and H Picht. “Institutional Arrangements and the Commons Dilemma.”
Dolsak, N, E Ostrom, and F Mason. “The Commons in the New Millennium: Challenges and Adaptations.”
Janssen, RL Goldstone, F Menczer, and E Ostrom. “Effect of Rule Choice in Dynamic Interactive Spatial Commons.” thecommonsjournal.org
Ostrom, E. “Institutional Arrangements for Resolving the Commons Dilemma: Some Contending Approaches.”
Ostrom, E. “The Evolution of Norms, Rules, and Rights.” dlc.dlib.indiana.edu